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INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM TRIALS
Gregory S. McNeal *
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the current debate in national security law scholarship
focuses on institutional design issues related to the balancing of
values such as legitimacy, effectiveness, fairness and efficiency. A
part of that debate centers around the legitimacy of tribunals es-
tablished to try alleged terrorists. Critics of those tribunals assert
they are an illegitimate form of justice and require reform or re-
placement by a new national security court.1 These scholars are
principally engaged in a debate over institutional design. This ar-
ticle seeks to contribute to that debate, and also to the larger in-
stitutional design literature by providing a theoretical framework
for understanding and evaluating legitimacy considerations in
the institutional design process. While adding legitimacy as an
analytical component may further complicate an already complex
legal and policy debate, I contend that the benefits to be derived
from maximizing legitimacy are too important to neglect. I begin
the article by providing a theoretical template for analyzing insti-
* Gregory S. McNeal, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, Dickinson School of Law. Thanks to Amos N. Guiora, James T. Ziegenfuss, John
O'Herron, and participants in a doctoral seminar at Penn State for insightful comments
regarding earlier versions of this article.
1. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITrES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 165-66 (2008); Amos Guiora
& John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Sus-
pected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356, 361 (2008), http://www.pennum
bra.com/debates/pdfs/terrorcourts.pdf; Harvey Rishikof, Is It Time for a Federal Terrorist
Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions: Problems, Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1, 5 (2003); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists'
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; ANDREW C. MCCARTHY & ALYKHAN VELSHI, AM.
ENTER. INST., WE NEED A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT 2 (2007), http://www.defenddemo
cracy.org/images/stories/national%20security%20court.pdf; cf. Robert Chesney & Jack
Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal Military Detention Models, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2008) (discussing how the military detention model and the civi-
lian criminal model cannot meet the central legal challenge of modern terrorism).
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tutional innovations such as national security courts. Using the
sociological theory of institutional isomorphism, I detail how or-
ganizations driven by the need for legitimacy and its associated
benefits ultimately evolve to resemble one another.
The analytical framework I outline in this first section is not
intended to provide an all encompassing institutional design
template, nor is it intended to provide a singular metric for eva-
luating national security courts or any other institution en toto.
Rather, the analytical framework I propose is useful for sensitiz-
ing institutional designers and legal scholars to a specific form of
legitimacy derived from the pressure for conformity placed on in-
stitutions by external observers. That conformity pressure may
force institutional innovations such as military commissions and
national security courts to comply with formal and informal ex-
ternal mandates (in this case imposed by law or prompted by pub-
lic opinion), overcome uncertainty by copying existing and legiti-
mate forms (in this case judicial institutions), and conform with
the norms which are dominant in a field (in this case the legal
profession).
Importantly, this analytical framework, with its focus on legi-
timacy, sensitizes scholars to the fact that while an institution
may achieve an optimal level of legitimacy, it may do so by adopt-
ing an inefficient form. The discussion thus highlights an under-
lying and as yet unspoken tension in the scholarly debate: that is,
an institutional innovation such as a national security court,
which may be extremely effective at achieving certain counterter-
rorism goals, may also be unable to simultaneously achieve con-
formity-based legitimacy. This may be an outcome that policy-
makers are willing to accept, much as some did with the military
commissions. However, scholars should explicitly acknowledge
this reality.
Building upon this theoretical framework, the article next de-
monstrates the tension between effectiveness and legitimacy by
highlighting key historical lessons for institutional designers. I
trace the history of post-September 11th military commissions
and detail how they failed to achieve an optimal level of legitima-
cy due to their imperfect conformity with existing courts. This
part of the article explains how the designers of the military
commissions focused their attention primarily on effectiveness,
not legitimacy. These designers copied a potentially illegitimate
trial system, shielded themselves from normative pressures, and
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disregarded the value which an institution can derive from con-
formity.
The article, after explaining the pitfalls of imperfect conformi-
ty, next explains the consequences of selective or incomplete con-
formity. I begin by analyzing elements of the Hamdan2 opinion
which I contend represents a coercive mandate for conformity. I
explain how Congress, when faced with this coercive mandate
from the Court, selectively mimicked the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice ("UCMJ") in the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"). I further detail how the institutional design process fol-
lowed by Congress was largely shielded from the mechanisms of
conformity, which resulted in legislation that was only slightly
modified in the face of informal coercive pressure (from public
opinion) and normative pressure (exerted by the then-Chief Pros-
ecutor of the military commissions). The result was a military tri-
al system which only selectively conformed and thereby failed to
achieve optimal legitimacy.
The implications of these theories for institutional designers
and national security court proponents are explained in the final
portion of the article. I contend that for an institution to achieve
optimal legitimacy, it must conform its practices with those that
exist in its organizational field. For judicial institutions, this
means that the values of fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency
must be considered along with legitimacy. Ultimately, the article
suggests that because a national security court will by its nature
depart from the structure and practice of an Article III court, na-
tional security court proponents must sensitize themselves to the
challenge of balancing legitimacy (derived from conformity) with
effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, the best approach for the
institutional design process may be to assess the legitimate Ar-
ticle III court framework and determine where those courts are
insufficient to meet the objectives of a robust counterterrorism
program. Designers should then narrowly and selectively modify
the existing legitimate institutional form rather than taking a
bottom-up approach, which creates new institutions from scratch.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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II. INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM AND THE QUEST
FOR LEGITIMACY
Institutional theory provides important insights into the con-
cept of legitimacy which can frame the debate regarding national
security court proposals. Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as "a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially con-
structed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."3 This
definition, which employs notions like "generalized perception" or
"socially constructed system," emphasizes the dependence of legi-
timacy on collective observers.4 Stated differently, the legitimacy
of an institution is dependent upon external "legitimacy provid-
ers."5 If this definition offered by institutional theorists is correct,
then a natural question for those seeking to design new national
security courts should be: "How can a new institution earn the
approval of these 'legitimacy providers'?" The following section
contends that one key aspect of legitimacy is conformity with ex-
isting institutional forms.6
A. Institutional Isomorphism
Institutional isomorphism is a sociological theory that posits
that once an organization is structured and constituted, powerful
environmental forces emerge which cause the organization to
evolve, eventually becoming more similar to others in its field; or-
ganizations pursue such similarity regardless of whether it leads
to greater efficiency.7 Through this conformity process, organiza-
3. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches
20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995) (noting that "over the years, social scientists have
offered a number of definitions of legitimacy, with varying degrees of specificity," some
with evaluative and cognitive components).
4. Ilfdio Barreto & Charles Baden-Fuller, To Conform or To Perform? Mimetic Beha-
viour, Legitimacy-Based Groups and Performance Consequences, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1559,
1561 (2006).
5. Id.
6. Importantly, there are other aspects of legitimacy that this article will not ad-
dress. For a more detailed overview of those aspects, see Suchman, supra note 3, at 577-
85.
7. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
148-49 (1983) (discussing their central research question, which asks why "there is such
startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices" across bureaucratic struc-
tures). DiMaggio and Powell attribute such homogeneity to the activities of a diverse set of
[Vol. 43:967
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tions within a population resemble others which face the same set
of environmental conditions.8 The phenomenon draws the atten-
tion of the institutional designer to the fact that "[t]he major fac-
tors that organizations must take account of in their environ-
ments are other organizations."9 As a consequence, by reference
to other organizations, officials are informed of how to structure
their own organization. 10 According to the theory, organizations
must concern themselves with "political power and institutional
legitimacy"--because these are two intangible resources required
for institutional success." As such, national security court propo-
nents must sensitize themselves to the dominant practices of oth-
er tribunals and attempt to resemble those other institutions if
they expect to garner the benefits of political support which flow
from institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, it is important to
note that legitimacy, according to the theory of institutional iso-
morphism, is almost completely derived from conformity. That is
to say that actions which conform to the common view are legiti-
mate and need not be effective to be legitimate-they simply
must conform. 2
B. Mechanisms of Conformity in Institutional Isomorphism
Institutional isomorphism is premised upon conformity result-
ing from the influence of environmental forces on organizations.
That conformity is produced through three mechanisms, briefly
summarized as follows: "[C]oercive isomorphism (which stems
from political influence), mimetic isomorphism (which results
from responses to uncertainty), and normative isomorphism
(which results from the professionalization of managers and spe-
cialists). Each of these mechanisms describes a process by which
organizations which structure an organizational field through a process of institutional
definition or structuration. Id. at 148. Once organizations are structured, DiMaggio and
Powell contend that homogenization results from rational decisions constructed within an
organizational environment which features pressures that result in conformity and homo-
genization. Id.
8. Amos Hawley, HUMAN ECOLOGY, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 334 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
9. HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 265 (2008).
10. DEREK S. PUGH & DAVID J. HICKSON, WRITERS ON ORGANIZATIONS 166 (6th ed.
2007).
11. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150. The authors cited to additional scholars
who "clearly recognize this and include political and institutional legitimacy as a major
resource." Id. at 150 n.6.
12. See PUGH & HICKSON, supra note 10, at 166.
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ideas from institutions in the organization's environment become
legitimated and adopted."13
As their generally worded definitions suggest, these mechan-
isms are not always empirically distinct or capable of singular
characterization;14 they should instead be viewed as components
within an analytic typology or framework. Due to their general
definition, aspects of these mechanisms may intermingle even
though "they tend to derive from different conditions and may
lead to different outcomes."15 As a consequence, the scope of any
one mechanism's influence will depend upon the mix of forces ex-
erted on an organization at any given time. For example, formal
coercive mandates such as laws may be ignored or selectively
complied with until informal coercive pressure in the form of pub-
lic opinion forces action or complete compliance; concomitantly,
the resulting action will largely depend upon the greater of the
two pressures exerted. Below I provide an expanded explanation
of each mechanism and illustrate these theories using examples
drawn from national security law, international law, and organi-
zational theory.
1. Coercive Institutional Isomorphism
The mechanism of coercive isomorphism results from formal
and informal conformity pressures "exerted on organizations by
other organizations upon which they are dependent."16 Examples
of formal pressures are obvious to legal scholars-they are pres-
sures felt by organizations in the form of force, such as rules, reg-
ulations, laws, and judicial opinions. Informal pressures, on the
other hand, are felt as persuasion and may be found in dicta, cus-
tom, handbooks, and other non-binding, yet coercive, phenomena.
The illustration below further clarifies these concepts.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court declared that mil-
itary commissions established by Presidential Military Order to
try non-citizen "enemy combatants" ("PMO Commissions") were
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, supra note 7, at 150 ("For example, external actors
may induce an organization to conform to its peers by requiring it to perform a particular
task [coercive] and specifying the profession responsible for its performance [normative].
Or mimetic change may reflect environmentally constructed uncertainties.").
15. Id.
16. Id.
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invalid because they lacked the required explicit congressional
authorization or authorization by the laws of war.17 The Court
further explained that Article 36 of the UCMJ1 8 required that
rules of procedure for courts-martial and military commissions
promulgated by the President may not "be 'contrary to or incon-
sistent with' the UCMJ-however practical it may seem," and
that "the rules adopted must be 'uniform insofar as practicable.'
That is, the rules applied to military commissions must be the
same as those applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity
proves impracticable."19
The Court's requirement that the commissions be authorized
by legislation and conform with the UCMJ is a clear example of
formal, coercive institutional isomorphism. Stated in the lan-
guage of institutional theory, the PMO Commissions were invali-
dated by an organization in their environment on which they de-
pended for their legitimacy. The invalidation carried with it the
force of law, and effectively mandated that the legitimacy of any
new organization (e.g., new military commissions) would require
authorization by Congress. ° While such a legal command consti-
tutes both formal and coercive pressure, it alone is not enough to
establish isomorphism, which requires that such pressure lead to
conformity with other organizations in the same field.2" The theo-
retical requirements were fulfilled by the Court's conformity
mandate reflected in its reference to Article 36 of the UCMJ. 22
17. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 602-03 (2006). See infra Part III for a
more extensive analysis of institutional isomorphism and Hamdan.
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006).
19. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Separation of Powers:
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld-The Anti-Roberts, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 573, 579-80 (2007) (questioning
why the Court, having found the PMO commissions to be unauthorized, detailed in dicta
how they failed to meet UCMJ standards); Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judi-
cial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 761 (2007) (discussing how the Hamdan decision is a
statement by the Court of its judicial authority).
20. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601-02.
21. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 149-50.
22. See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 643-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing 1 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 248 (2d series 1894), available at http://cdl.library.cor
nell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/sgml/moa-idx?notisid=ANU4519-0114) (referring to conformity as the
'uniformity principle" and stating that "those military commissions generally have
adopted the structure and procedure of courts-martial"); see also Tung Yin, Tom and Jerry
(and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the President, the Court, and Congress
in the War on Terrorism, 42 TULSA L. REV.. 505, 514-15 (2007) (explaining the "uniformity
principle" in Article 36 of the UCMJ and the principle's application by Justice Stevens in
Hamdan).
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At this point in our theoretical explication, two issues arise
which can help illustrate the distinctions between the formal and
informal coercive mechanisms. The first issue is whether the
Court's reference to, and its analysis of, Article 36 of the UCMJ is
dicta or part of the holding.23 If it is dicta, it does not carry with it
the force of law, but it may nevertheless be considered coercive
institutional isomorphism, albeit the informal type. Stated diffe-
rently, if the Court's reference to Article 36 is dicta, it is conformi-
ty pressure from an external organization felt not as force, but as
persuasion. While the force of law is more coercive because of the
sanctions associated with avoiding its dictates, the ensuing dis-
cussion should make clear that even mere persuasion can be a
powerful force for effectuating conformity.
The second issue reinforces the first, namely the fact that the
Court itself makes clear that it is not flatly mandating conformi-
ty, or in its words, uniformity.24 Instead, the Court states that
"Itihe uniformity principle is not an inflexible one; it does not
preclude all departures from the procedures dictated for use by
courts-martial. But any departure must be tailored to the exigen-
cy that necessitates it."25 Here, the Court, another organization in
the military commission's institutional field, is formally mandat-
ing that departures be tailored to exigencies, while informally
persuading institutional designers to remain cognizant of the li-
mited flexibility of the uniformity principle.
While formal and informal coercive isomorphism look to other
organizations as the source of pressure to conform, another type
of coercive pressure-culturally driven coercive isomorphism-
instead looks more broadly at society-level pressures that drive
an organization to conform or that compel it to appear similar to
other organizations in its environment.26 Stated differently, cul-
turally driven coercive isomorphism results from "cultural expec-
tations in the society within which organizations function."27 This
loosely defined concept is perhaps most susceptible to inadvertent
definitional overlap with mimetic and normative forms of isomor-
23. See Kmiec, supra note 19, at 579-80 (indicating that the Court's analysis of Article
36 was dicta).
24. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620.
25. Id. (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 835 n.81 (2d ed.
1920)).
26. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150.
27. Id.
[Vol. 43:967
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phism. To avoid the potential for definitional overlap, scholars
should recognize three distinguishing characteristics. First, cul-
turally driven coercive isomorphism is exogenous. Much like for-
mal and informal coercive isomorphism, it is environmental pres-
sure exerted from outside the organization. Second, culturally
driven coercive isomorphism is distinguishable from mimetic
isomorphism because its pressure is not grounded in environmen-
tal uncertainty, a key characteristic of mimetic mechanisms.
Third, culturally driven coercive isomorphism is distinguishable
from normative isomorphism because normative mechanisms are
endogenous, stemming almost entirely from the professionaliza-
tion of individuals within the organization.29 Thus, culturally dri-
ven coercive isomorphism is distinguishable because it is observ-
able when organizations feel externally derived societal (rather
than institutional) pressure to conform their activities with oth-
ers in their environment. That conformity pressure is driven by a
desire to gain support from society or other entities upon which
the organization relies for success or legitimacy.3"
An illustrative counterterrorism-related example of culturally
driven coercive isomorphism is the media visitation program im-
plemented by the Department of Defense at Guantdnamo Bay in
28. See infra Part II.B.2. for a discussion of mimetic institutional isomorphism and
infra Part II.B.3. for a discussion of normative isomorphism.
29. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150-54 (discussing coercive, mimetic, and
normative isomorphism). It is entirely plausible for normative pressures to cause cultural-
ly driven coercive isomorphism. An obvious example is norm-driven pressure from profes-
sionalized cultures such as lawyers. Such professionals are oftentimes represented by pro-
fessional associations like the ABA, which exert pressure in the form of cultural expect-
ations derived from professional norms. For examples of such culturally driven coercive
pressure, see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2008), available at http:
//www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc-toc.html; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJCapproved.pdf; MODEL
GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL SERVS. (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.orglegalservices/paralegals/downloads/modelguidelines.pdf, GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES (Am. Bar Ass'n 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/down
loads/claid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf. However, the important dis-
tinguishing characteristic is that culturally driven coercive isomorphism comes from ex-
ternal (or environmental) societal pressures, whereas normative pressure is associated
with the professionals within an organization. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at
150. For a more complete discussion of normative isomorphism, see infra Part II.B.3.
30. See DiMaggio and Powell, supra note 7, at 151 (providing an example of subtle
coercive isomorphism "in which neighborhood organizations in urban communities, many
of which are committed to participatory democracy, are driven to developing organization-
al hierarchies in order to gain support from more hierarchically organized donor organiza-
tions.").
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Cuba.31 The program, which allows members of the media to visit
the Guantinamo detention facility, was likely implemented by
the Department of Defense to address the pressures arising from
cultural and societal expectations of openness and transparency
regarding prisons and detention facilities."
Culturally driven coercive institutional isomorphism posits
that conformity pressure may come about not just from the for-
mal and informal processes discussed above, but also from cul-
tural expectations.33 Thus, while there is no formal legal require-
ment forcing the Department of Defense to operate in a more
open and transparent manner,34 significant coercive pressure was
brought to bear through cultural expectations. It is important to
reemphasize that the general theory of institutional isomorphism
suggests that pressure for conformity may run counter to efficien-
cy.35 In this example, this is especially apparent in light of Guan-
tanamo's status as a facility created primarily to allow for intelli-
gence collection through interrogations.36 Such a status suggests
that the government could operate Guantdnamo more efficiently
by not creating a public relations structure that allows media
31. See U.S. ARMY, CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 28.1 (2003),
available at http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/gitmo-sop.pdf.
32. See id.
33. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150.
34. See, e.g., Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD Releases Names of 759 Current, Former Guanta-
namo Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, May 15, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15754 (stating that the Department of Defense released docu-
ments and names regarding detainees not because they were ordered to, but because they
reached an agreement with the Associated Press.)
35. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 147.
36. See Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 29, 43-44 (2008) (discussing how the priority of the executive for detainees at
Guantinamo is intelligence gathering rather than obtaining information for criminal
prosecution); see also Morris D. Davis, The Influence of Ex Parte Quirin and Courts-
Martial on Military Commissions, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (2008) (concurring with
McNeal's argument that protecting intelligence was a factor in the set-up of Guantdnamo).
See generally John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 100 AM. J. INVL L. 455, 473 (2006) (discussing President Bush's remarks of
the need for Guantdnamo to remain open in order to protect the American people); Jona-
than H. Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, THE HASTINGS CTR. REP., July 1, 2005, at 17 (ex-
plaining the use of physicians at Guantinamo in developing interrogations methods to
produce intelligence); MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SETON HALL UNIV. LAW CTR. FOR POLICY &
RESEARCH CAPTURED ON TAPE: INTERROGATION AND VIDEOTAPING OF DETAINEES IN
GUANTANAMO 3-4 (2008), http://law.shu.edu/news/captured-tape-2788-with-appendix.pdf
(discussing the videotaped documentation of interrogations at Guantdnamo and the de-
struction of the tapes to protect interrogators).
[Vol. 43:967
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tours of its facilities; however, such gains in efficiency would come
with a potential loss of legitimacy.37
The creation of a media-visit program by the Department of
Defense, in the absence of a formal requirement that such a pro-
gram exist, can be attributed to culturally driven pressures tied
to two societal expectations. First, the history of public inquiries
into the operations of clandestine organizations represents a so-
cietal or cultural skepticism of organizations that operate in se-
cret and reflects an expectation of openness regarding the activi-
ties of government.3" Second, the dominant practice of domestic
civilian detention facilities is to operate in an open and transpa-
rent fashion by frequently allowing media tours. 9 This dominant
practice contributes to conformity pressure, borne of societal ex-
pectations, regarding these types of facilities. These two pheno-
mena, grounded in cultural expectations, combined to create ex-
ternal pressure on the Department of Defense to conform its
media visitation policies to those of other detention facilities. The
resulting conformity was likely prompted by a desire to avoid an
adverse impact on societal perceptions of Guantdnamo's organiza-
tional legitimacy and thereby satisfy a need for political sup-
port.4 °
37. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 147 (explaining that institutional isomor-
phism posits that organizations do not seek conformity for reasons of efficiency but rather
for reasons of legitimacy).
38. See, e.g., LOCH K. JOHNSON, AMERICA'S SECRET POWER: THE CIA IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 9 (1989) (explaining how cultural expectations regarding secret agencies evolved
from an era of discretion and trust, through one of skepticism, to the modern era of dis-
trust which sought greater democratic control, with such pressure for controls demonstrat-
ing "a strong public interest in the public disclosures of the functions of governmental
agencies . . . [and] also a strong public interest in the effective functioning of an intelli-
gence service"); see also Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181,
182 (1999) (discussing how publicity is needed over secrecy when it comes to government
policies in order to promote the democratic principle of accountability); Geoffrey R. Stone
& William P. Marshall, Secrecy, the Enemy of Democracy, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2006, at C7
(contending that secrets kept by the government and government agencies are enemies of
the American people).
39. See, e.g., BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 1480.05, PROGRAM
STATEMENT: NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS 1 (2000), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/prog
stat/1480_005.pdf; Terry Frieden, Reporters Get First Look Inside Mysterious Supermax
Prison, CNN.com. Sept. 13, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/13/super
max.btsc/index.html.
40. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150 (explaining how organizations need
political support).
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Of course, those potentially adverse cultural expectations and
their associated pressure for a culture of openness at Guantdna-
mo were further amplified by lawsuits requesting the same open-
ness,4 1 repeated allegations of ill treatment,42 and allegations of
substandard living conditions in detention facilities. 4  In fact, the
pressure was so great that the Department of Defense not only
created a media-visit program, it even implemented a 'Virtual
Video Visit" program which allowed members of the public and
the media to tour facilities through an internet interface." All of
41. See, e.g., Rhem, supra note 34 (explaining how a federal Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit brought by the Associated Press forced the release of information about Guan-
tdnamo detainees on at least four occasions).
42. See, e.g., Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization
of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 90-94
(2007) (describing the interrogation methods used by the armed forces and the CIA that
are considered torture and explaining allegations of torture); Ray Murphy, Prisoner of War
Status and the Question of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 3 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 257, 272
(2003) (discussing actions taken against the detainees in order to "break" them in interro-
gation); Joshua A. Decker, Comment, Is the United States Bound by the Customary Inter-
national Law of Torture? A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on Terror 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 803, 805-08 (2006) (explaining the allegations of torture of detainees at Guantd-
namo and the International Committee of the Red Cross Report on torture at Guantdna-
mo).
43. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES 5-9 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmol004/gitmol004.pdf (describing living
conditions at Guantdnamo obtained through interviews with detainees); KEN GUDE, CTR.
AM. PROGRESS, How To CLOSE GUANTANAMO 18 (2008), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2008/06/pdf/guantanamo.pdf (contending that the conditions of con-
finement affect the competency of detainees and hinder prosecution); INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR
AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST,
INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION 11-12 (2004), available at http://download.repubblica.it
pdf/rapporto crocerossa.pdf (reporting serious violations of International Humanitarian
Law in regards to conditions and treatment of the detainees); Murphy, supra note 42, at
272-73 (discussing the standards for human treatment of prisoners of war and how the
conditions at Guantdnamo do not meet those standard); Johan Steys, Guantanamo Bay:
The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 7-8 (2004) (discussing the general condi-
tions detainees experience at Guantdnamo); Maggie Ardiente, Everything But the Truth:
Allegations of Abuse and Torture at Guantanamo Bay, THE HUMANIST, Jan-Feb. 2006, at
16 (summarizing the allegations of abuse, torture, and inhumane living conditions of de-
tainees). But see FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., VISIT TO GUANTANAMO BAY, 2006-07, H.C. 44-
2, at 14e, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2006O7/cmselect/cm
faff/44/44.pdf (concluding, after visiting Guantdnamo, that the facilities were comparable
to British detention facilities); Kathleen T. Rhem, Officials Decry Use of Outdated Images
to Portray Gitmo, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18200.
44. See Joint Task Force GuantAnamo Virtual Video Visit, http://www.jtfgtmo.south
com.millvirtualtourintro.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). According to the JTTF website,
[The] Virtual Visit is designed to give you the viewer a feel for what it is like
to be a visiting journalist on a media tour. The camps are numbered in the
order of their construction, and are ordered for viewing just as you would pro-
ceed in person. At the end of your journey, you will see the original Guanti-
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these efforts at conformity came despite the fact that the detai-
nees in Guantdnamo were deemed "unlawful enemy combatants"
and were not convicted prisoners like those held in U.S. prisons."5
Furthermore, as noted above, the potential inefficiencies which
could result from allowing media visits to a facility designed for
intelligence gathering were secondary concerns in the face of cul-
turally driven coercive isomorphism which drove the Department
of Defense to implement homogeneous organizational policies
aimed at improving legitimacy.46
As the examples above illustrate, formal, informal, and cultu-
rally driven coercive mechanisms can be equally effective in
bringing about organizational change and contributing to institu-
tional isomorphism. Organizations generally, and counterterror-
ism organizations specifically, evolve to conform with their insti-
tutional environment under pressures which are felt as force,
such as the formal requirements of law; as persuasion, such as
dicta; and through expectations established by the culture and
society in which the counterterrorism organization operates.
namo detention facility, Camp X-Ray, which was only in use from January
through April 2002, and other highlights of U.S. Naval Station Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for De-
tainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 33, 34 n.3 (2006) (explaining
that "[w]hat sets detainees in the war on terror apart from other classes of detainees is
that typically they lack the legal protections associated with either military or criminal
prisoners. Unlike recognized combatants, they do not enjoy POW status. And unlike crim-
inal defendants or convicts, they enjoy no presumption of innocence, nor may they present
a defense of confront their accusers in a court of law"). But see Douglass Cassel, Pretrial
and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under Interna-
tional Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 845-49 (2008) (arguing that international
human rights law and international humanitarian law prohibit incommunicado detention
for periods lasting more than a few days, that those detained must be given a right to
communicate with their consulate for assistance, their family, and their counsel, and that
the International Committee of the Red Cross is entitled to visit all places where persons
are detained and interview them).
46. Cf. Glenn R. Carroll & Jacques Delacroix, Organizational Mortality in the News-
paper Industries of Argentina and Ireland: An Ecological Approach, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169,
187 (1982) (explaining how organizations created "during political crises are likely to be
established for an explicit political purpose and, consequently, [ I become obsolete once the
crisis is resolved"); see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing "political
power and institutional legitimacy" as intangible resources required for institutional suc-
cess).
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2. Mimetic Institutional Isomorphism
The mechanism of mimetic institutional isomorphism is ob-
served when organizations respond to uncertainty and, faced with
unclear prescriptions, imitate other organizations within their
field. Mimicry helps organizations overcome ambiguity and also
provides legitimacy in the face of situations with indeterminate
solutions.17 "The advantages of mimetic behavior in the economy
of human action are considerable; when an organization faces a
problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, problemistic
search may yield a viable solution with little expense."" Such
mimicry was observed when Japan, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, modeled many of its governmental institutions on successful
western prototypes by sending officials to study the courts and
police in France, and the military and other government agencies
in Great Britain and the United States.4 9 More recently, the Iraqi
High Tribunal adopted rules of procedure modeled upon the rules
and procedures used by modern international war crimes tribun-
als. 50
Much homogeneity amongst organizational structures can be
attributed to mimetic mechanisms, as new organizations are
modeled upon old ones in a repeating cycle which results in little
variation in institutional fields. Organizations faced with uncer-
tainty and a need for effectiveness and legitimacy tend to look
like others, not because of concrete evidence of the effectiveness of
other organizations, but instead because adopting existing models
is more likely to ensure legitimacy.51 This quest for legitimacy in
the face of uncertainty has been empirically tested by scholars
who have interestingly noted that the relationship between mi-
metic mechanisms and efficiency in a variety of contexts demon-
strates that organizations will oftentimes seek conformity
47. See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
118-20 (1963).
48. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 151 (citing CYERT & MARCH, supra note 44).
Problemistic search refers to a "search that is stimulated by a problem ... and is directed
toward finding a solution to that problem." CYERT & MARCH, supra note 47, at 121.
49. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 151.
50. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDER-
STANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBuNAL 7-8 (2006).
51. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 151-52.
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through mimicry despite information which suggests such copying
will undermine efficiency and organizational goals.52
Similarly, legal scholars have identified a process of "legal mi-
micry" which parallels those found in the social science litera-
ture. 3 Mark Drumbl, for example, describes a process in interna-
tional criminal law by which "[d]omestic actors often mimic
international trendsetters, whose modern ideas they transplant
to national and local contexts."54 This process, Drumbl concludes,
often leads to local justice processes "that may favor the interests
of those only morally affected by the violence ... [such as the in-
ternational community] over those actually physically afflicted by
it."55 Such a phenomenon may lead to legitimacy for local justice
organizations which model themselves after accepted interna-
tional institutions, but also leads to inefficiency if advancing the
interests of victims (e.g., those physically affected by violence) is
considered a measure of a local institution's effective perfor-
mance. Ultimately, Drumbl's conclusions suggest that the mimi-
cry present in international criminal justice may have created lo-
cal justice which is seemingly legitimate but also woefully
inefficient. 56
52. See, e.g., Barreto & Baden-Fuller, supra note 4, at 1576 (demonstrating how or-
ganizations' mimetic behavior is driven by legitimacy based motivations and that organi-
zations will imitate others, even if doing so conflicts with information they possess that
demonstrates conformity will negatively affect the organization's profitability); Amer A.
Kaissi & James W. Begun, Fads, Fashions, and Bandwagons in Health Care Strategy, 33
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 94 (2008) (using interviews and a case study approach, the au-
thors find that imitation strategies largely derive from copying the behavior of rivals in an
effort to keep up with exemplar practices, however, such strategies are oftentimes not tied
to an organization's unique local conditions or circumstances).
53. See Peter H. Sand, Current Trends in African Legal Geography: The Interfusion of
Legal Systems, 5 AFR. L. STUD. 1, 6 (1971) (describing how legal systems evolve over time
to resemble one another, intermingling components from "Anglican" and "Romanesque"
systems in a process of "legislative cross-fertilization." Such legal mimicry was first ob-
served in the colonial era as demonstrated by the "spreading of the Australian TORRENS
system of land registration in the former French and Belgian territories [and by] certain
French legal concepts introduced via Egypt in the former British Sudan"); cf. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1115-22 (2000) (discussing how
increased citations to foreign court opinions and increased face-to-face contact among con-
stitutional judges from different countries is promoting "legal cross-fertilization" in the
areas of human rights and constitutional law). Such cross-fertilization is an indirect form
of legal mimicry.
54. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2007).
55. Id. at 124.
56. See id. at 10, 124 (describing how dominant procedural and institutional metho-
dologies in international criminal justice "fall short in terms of legitimacy and effective-
ness" and critically arguing that the resulting externalization of justice is illegitimate be-
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In an analogous context, Anne-Marie Slaughter has identified a
process of legal cross-fertilization and transnational legal dialo-
gue which closely parallels the mechanism of mimetic isomor-
phism. Slaughter describes how courts throughout the world see
themselves engaging in a "common enterprise, even if only in the
sense of confrontation of common issues or problems. 57 According
to Slaughter, these Courts attempt to "transpose each other's de-
cisions to their own circumstances" to solve "generic legal prob-
lems such as the balancing of rights and duties, individual and
community interests, and the protection of individual expecta-
tions."5" These courts, facing generic legal problems and uncer-
tainty about how to resolve them, provide an insightful analogue
to the circumstances organizations face which drive them toward
mimicry of successful institutional forms and organizational prac-
tices.
In the context of counterterrorism, perhaps the most obvious
and relevant example of mimetic processes is the military com-
mission system established by President George W. Bush's No-
vember 13, 2001 Presidential Military Order.59 Faced with the
uncertainty associated with the A1-Qaeda threat, administration
officials sought a way "independent of and distinct from the crim-
inal process-to detain enemy combatants for the duration of a
given armed conflict, including the.., conflict against al Qae-
da."6 ° To achieve that aim, the administration modeled the PMO
Commissions after military tribunals used during World War II,
largely mimicking the procedures and organizational form used
nearly sixty years earlier.6' The history and efficacy of these
commissions were viewed as legitimate and an "apt precedent" by
cause it shows a remarkable democratic deficit, namely "the exclusion of afflicted popula-
tions from the design, development, and operation of accountability mechanisms"); see also
Alette Smeulers, Punishing the Enemies of All Mankind, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 971, 987-89
(2008) (explaining that Drumbl demonstrates how legal mimicry not only exists, but also
"'narrow[s] the diversity of national and local accountability modalities'" and favors the
perceived legitimate international norms and institutions over otherwise effective national
institutions) (citing DRUMBL, supra note 54, at 121).
57. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH.
L. REV. 99, 126-27 (1994).
58. Id. at 127
59. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 (2006); see also infra Part III.
60. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684 (D.S.C. 2005).
61. See Davis, supra note 36, at 124 n.ll (arguing that the 1942 commissions became
the template for the plan to prosecute detainees in the global war on terrorism).
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the administration. That view, when combined with what some
contend was a particularly expansive theory of inherent executive
powers,62 led the designers of military commissions to believe
they had successfully copied a legitimate and effective institu-
tional form which would be accepted in the institutional field of
war crimes trials." Of course, recent history has demonstrated
that such a belief was misplaced with regard to both the legitima-
cy and the effectiveness of the PMO Commissions. Nonetheless,
the important point is to recognize how the mechanism of mimet-
ic isomorphism can lead institutional designers to respond to un-
certainty by copying previously tested organizational forms which
they perceive as either legitimate or effective.
3. Normative Isomorphism
Organizations also face normative pressures for isomorphic
change. These endogenous pressures stem primarily from profes-
sionalization of actors within organizations.64 Professionalization
can cause isomorphism through "the resting of formal education
and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university
specialists," and through "the growth and elaboration of profes-
sional networks that span organizations and across which new
62. See David Gray Adler, George Bush as Commander in Chief. Toward the Nether
World of Constitutionalism, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 525, 525 (2006) (describing the
Bush Administration's conception of the Commander-in-Chief clause as an expansive one
which "has launched presidential power on a trajectory toward the realm of illimitable and
unaccountable power"); Louis Fisher, The Scope of Inherent Powers, in THE POLARIZED
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 31, 53, 55-56 (George C. Edwards III & Desmond S.
King eds., 2007) (arguing that the Bush Administration frequently relied on the theory of
"inherent authority in time of war or emergency" to act contrary to law, or at least inter-
preted acting "within the law" to mean "pursuant to what lawyers within the Administra-
tion could argue were within the executive powers under Article II [of the U.S. Constitu-
tion]"). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2055, 2131-32 (2005) (offering an analyti-
cal framework for interpreting the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF")
and contending that Congress authorized the use of military commissions to try individu-
als covered by the AUMF for violations of the laws of war); John 0. McGinnies & Ilya So-
min, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1228 (2007)
(explaining that "[i]nherent authority includes power that Congress may not override,
such as the Commander-in-Chief power, and authority that the President can exercise on-
ly in the absence of a congressional directive").
63. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11: RECURRING THREATS TO
AMERICA'S FREEDOMS 172 (2008); see also Davis, supra note 36, at 124 ("The history of the
Nazi saboteurs was to some a precedent that proved that military commissions were swift,
secret, and successful, and that the judicial branch would exhibit fawning obeisance to the
President on matters of national security.").
64. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 152.
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models diffuse rapidly."65 The formal education process is an ob-
vious source of normative pressure. For example, law schools are
largely responsible for developing norms amongst attorneys, and
those norms are quite similar across schools due to coercive pres-
sures such as accreditation requirements66 and mimetic pres-
sures, such as the need for legitimacy in a competitive rankings-
driven environment.67
In a related sense, networks of professionals such as bar asso-
ciations and other groups "create a pool of almost interchangeable
individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organi-
zations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition
that may override variations in tradition and control that might
otherwise shape organizational behavior."6 Taken together, pro-
fessional norms developed through formal education and profes-
sional networks can lead organizations to more closely resemble
each other, even in the absence of evidence that such isomor-
phism increases internal organizational efficiency.69
C. Summary of Institutional Isomorphism
The preceding discussion explained that institutional isomor-
phism consists of coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms
which will compel an organization to reflect the dominant form in
its institutional environment; such conformity will have beneficial
consequences for the organization's legitimacy and support, par-
65. Id.
66. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost
of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Matters, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1698, 1706
(2008) (noting that U.S. legal markets are among the most heavily regulated in the econ-
omy, with regulation over almost all aspects of legal production exercised in a fragmented
and unclear regime by individual state bar associations and state courts, largely driven by
decisions of the American Bar Association).
67. See Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World
Report Rankings Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L. J. 383 (2006)
(contending that "norms of uniformity and standardization have dominated the world of
legal education, substantially limiting law schools' ability to compete against one another"
and that as a consequence, law schools do not innovate due to the possibility that they
might jeopardize their accreditation, reputation, and future).
68. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 5, at 152.
69. See id. at 152-53 (explaining that other mechanisms which encourage normative
isomorphism are the filtering of personnel whereby individuals hired have similar back-
grounds, education, and training and that the exchange of information amongst profes-
sionals, personnel flows amongst organizations, and the desire by professionals to further
their careers all lead to homogenization).
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ticularly support from external organizations. In a counterterror-
ism context, adoption of the normatively preferable structure may
mean tacit approval by human rights organizations and other
outspoken groups,7 ° positive evaluations by watch-dog groups,
professional approval by bar associations, public approval,71 and
even increased support from allies.7 2 Conversely, failure to con-
form to legal requirements formally imposed or informally di-
rected at an organization by other organizations in its field can
lead to sanctions, such as the opprobrium of the previously identi-
fied groups or the withdrawal of support from allied nations.73 In
this respect, conformity can be seen not only in terms of legitima-
cy and external support, but also as a means by which an organi-
zation may remain free from sanctions and other negative conse-
quences.74 Thus, either by conscious choice or by differential
survival, organizations "can become structured in ways that
70. Human Rights First: Prosecuting Terrorism, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
blog/pursuit/2009/02/beyond-obamas-order-to-close-guantanamo.html (Feb. 3, 2009, 06:21
EST) (supporting President Obama's executive order directing the closure of the detention
facility at Guantdnamo Bay and halting the use of military commissions).
71. All Things Considered: Obama Takes Steps Toward Shutting Guantanamo, (NPR
radio broadcast Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=99681705 (demonstrating the positive indicators of public opinion which resulted
from the Obama Administration's decision to close Guantdnamo). The broadcast quotes
Eugene Fidell of the National Institute of Military Justice stating, "Obviously, the military
commissions have been severely discredited everywhere-in our legal system, in the court
of public opinion and around the world. So I find it hard to imagine that the Obama ad-
ministration would exert itself to preserve their viability." Id. See also All Things Consi-
dered: Admiral Applauds Guantanamo Closure Order (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 24,
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=99844564 (inter-
viewing Retired Rear Adm. John Huston, a former judge advocate general, on President
Obama's decision to suspend military commissions at Guantdnamo Bay and ultimately
close the facility there).
72. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV 953, 958 (2002) (explaining how legi-
timacy at the international level is critical for intelligence and law enforcement coopera-
tion and that American credibility is at a low ebb due to military tribunals and Guantd-
namo); Katharine Q. Seelye, Criticized, U.S. Brings Visitors to Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2002, at A8.
73. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
228 (2006) (noting how "British Prime Minister Tony Blair, an ardent supporter of the
Administration, described Guantdnamo as 'an anomaly that at some point has to be
brought to an end'"). Margulies further notes that for allies "whose support is wavering,
who find themselves on the knife edge between moderation and extremism, Guantanamo
provides powerful 'evidence of how America and the West make[s] the war [against] ter-
rorism synonymous with the war against Islam.' As Guantdnamo endures, their support
withers and their anger grows." Id. (citing Somini Sengupta & Salmon Masood, Guanta-
namo Comes to Define U.S. to Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at Al).
74. Lex Donaldson, The Conflict Between Contingency and Institutional Theories of
Organizational Design, in DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONS: 21ST CENTURY APPROACHES 3, 7
(Richard M. Burton et al. eds., 2008).
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make them conform to their institutional environment and so re-
ceive beneficial outcomes from their environment."75
D. Elevating Legitimacy over Effectiveness by Structuring for
Contingencies
As discussed above, institutional theory finds that organiza-
tions will evolve to garner external legitimacy and support, irres-
pective of the associated inefficiencies of conformity. In this re-
spect, it is in conflict with structural contingency theory, which
directs its attention inward and emphasizes the consequences for
efficiency and performance that stem from correct structural
choices. Structural contingency theory posits that the correct
choices are those which fit a particular set of circumstances.76
One theorist summarizes the distinction between institutional
theory and structural contingency theory, stating "[c]ontingency
theory deals in the outcome of structure on internal effectiveness.
Institutional theory deals in the outcome of structure on external
legitimacy and support."77
Structural contingency theory (as its name suggests) maintains
that relationships among organizational characteristics are con-
tingent or dependent upon the situation-that is to say, there is
no "one best model" of organizing. Instead an organizational de-
signer must look to an organization's context.7" Thus, structural
contingency theory is used in the literature on organizational de-
sign to prescribe structures while institutional theory seeks to
explain structures rather than offer prescriptions. As the discus-
sion in the prior section makes clear, however, certain prescrip-
tions will naturally flow from a calculated desire to achieve ex-
ternal legitimacy and support.7 9
The two theoretical approaches, given their focus on different
outcomes (internal effectiveness versus external legitimacy), are
inherently in conflict with regard to their theoretical prescrip-
tions. Structural contingency theory seeks structures which fit
75. Id. at 7-8.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. See B.J. HODGE ET AL., ORGANIZATION THEORY: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 21 (5th ed.
1996).
79. See Donaldson, supra note 74, at 5.
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the organization's particular circumstances and objectives and
will produce greater internal effectiveness, where effectiveness is
defined as goal attainment."0 Therefore, in a counterterrorism
context in which organizational designers may see their ultimate
responsibility as preventing terrorist attacks, the structure they
choose to maximize their effectiveness (e.g., achieving the goal of
preventing an attack) may place a lower priority on the structure
or practices which might lead to external legitimacy.
In practical terms those structures or practices which might
lead to external legitimacy could include the decision to afford in-
dividuals the full panoply of protections afforded by the Constitu-
tion or the Geneva Conventions, subjecting detention decisions to
external judicial review, or complying with existing procedures
embodied in customary international law or military manuals.
The point here is not to suggest that any one measure of external
legitimacy is appropriate or inappropriate, but instead to high-
light that there may be a tension between what an organizational
designer perceives as effective and what the external environment
may perceive as legitimate.
In the post-September 11th academic literature, a form of this
tension between internal effectiveness and external legitimacy is
apparent in the work of those who suggest a tension between se-
curity and liberty."1 One iteration of this view is articulated by
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who argue that "[t]here is a
straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security" and that "a
rational and well-functioning government ... will adjust its poli-
cies" based on contingencies such as emergencies, and will do so
in a manner that maximizes the welfare of the whole polity. 2
John Yoo, who was partly responsible for the creation of the PMO
Commissions, argued that they were "meant to balance two com-
peting goals: providing a fair trial for enemies who commit war
crimes, and protecting the nation's military and intelligence in-
80. See Talcott Parsons, Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Or-
ganizations-I, 1 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 63, 66 (1956) (explaining that in internal matters "the
primacy of goal-attainment among the functions of [an organization] gives priority to those
processes most directly involved with the success or failure of goal-oriented endeavors").
81. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 5-6 (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE
PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 3-5 (2006).
82. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 81, at 12.
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terests.""3 He bolsters this contingency-based argument with one
grounded in the language of legitimacy, stating:
[T]he tribunals.., would provide as fair a trial as the world has
known in a war context. Their procedures provided more due process
than those of the International Criminal Court .... The main criti-
cism was that they did not provide for review of any conviction by a
civilian court, but neither had the World War II commissions.
8 4
Both views exhibit a rational choice-based approach to organi-
zational design which orders preferences in a manner that places
effectiveness over legitimacy. Interestingly, the view articulated
by Yoo seems to rest on the assumption that achieving both out-
comes is possible. However, as will be explained below, while a
contingently derived approach may theoretically lead to legitima-
cy due to its effectiveness, such an outcome is unlikely given the
different prescriptions of contingency and institutional-based ap-
proaches.
Granted, it is theoretically possible that an organization "might
simultaneously adapt its structure to the contingencies, to gain
the benefits of high internal effectiveness, while also conforming
to the externally approved model structure to gain the benefits of
high external support." 5 This can be termed a complementary
approach, whereby the structural contingency theory and the in-
stitutional theory approach both prescribe an organizational form
which simultaneously has a high level of internal effectiveness
and high external support.8 6 There are two ways in which such
compatibility might come about: first, either the best fit struc-
tures happen to be identical; or second, portions of the structures
can be segmented in a manner which achieves both legitimacy
and effectiveness. As Donaldson explains, a segmented organiza-
tional structure is possible, for example, where the apex of an or-
ganization (such as the Office of the Chief Prosecutor in a legal
context or a CEO and board of directors in a business context) is
structured in a way that meets the demands of external legitima-
cy; while the internal operating core (interrogators and investiga-
tors, line prosecutors) may be structured to effectively meet con-
83. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSLDER'S AccoUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
204 (2006).
84. Id. at 209.
85. Donaldson, supra note 74, at 10.
86. Id.
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tingencies (such as the eliciting of coerced evidence) without con-
cern for external legitimacy. Donaldson further explains,
In this way, adoption of the institutionally approved model for the
organizational apex would produce maximum external support,
while, simultaneously, adoption of the structure for the operating
core that fits its contingencies would produce maximum effective-
ness. Hence, by segmented adaptations, both contingency and insti-
tutional requirements could be met, maximizing both internal effec-
tiveness and external support.
87
While complementarity is theoretically possible, it is unlikely, a
point which will be made clearer below. 8
III. EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY IN TENSION: LESSONS FROM
THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND OTHER TRIBUNALS
A. The Lessons of the PMO Commissions and Other War Crimes
Tribunals: Imperfect Isomorphism and Illegitimacy
On November 13, 2001, President Bush created a system of
military commissions modeled after those used during World War
II to try Nazi saboteurs who landed on U.S. soil determined to at-
tack American industrial targets.89 Officials within the Depart-
ment of Justice advised the President that such a system would
allow for the trial of Taliban and A1-Qaeda fighters without the
necessity of a jury or other procedural protections found in civi-
lian courts.9" Those organizational designers believed that the
PMO Commissions would enjoy legitimacy because the PMO
Commissions mimicked a system they believed had been declared
legitimate by a prior President, Congress, and the courts. One
lawyer who worked on the commissions amplified this point by
stating, "We relied on the same language in FDR's order, the
same congressional statute that FDR did, and we had a unanim-
ous Supreme Court decision on point .... As a lawyer advising a
client, it doesn't get much better than that."91 Of course, history
has demonstrated that the PMO Commissions were almost im-
87. Id. at 14-15.
88. See infra p. 14 5 - 4 6 .
89. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
90. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 108-09 (2007).
91. Id. at 109.
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mediately subject to criticism on both legitimacy and effective-
ness grounds.92 While reduced procedural protections may have
created what was in theory a more effective organizational struc-
ture for detaining, interrogating, and trying alleged terrorists,
that structure was plagued by a lack of legitimacy and external
support.
Importantly, much of the illegitimacy associated with the PMO
Commissions can be traced to organizational design process de-
fects which largely foreclosed outside input. That insular design
process resulted in misperceptions regarding the PMO Commis-
sion's relevant "institutional field" and isolated organizational de-
signers from the mechanisms of isomorphic conformity which
could have brought about legitimacy more quickly.
Earlier, this article described how organizations evolve to con-
form to others in their field through coercive, mimetic, and nor-
mative mechanisms.93 These mechanisms were present during
the development of the PMO Commissions. However, I contend
they were imperfectly present, crippled from the outset by a mis-
taken perception of what a legitimate system would look like in
the institutional field of tribunals. The debate over the military
commissions suggests that what is perceived as legitimate in the
organizational field of trials is an Article III court, court martial,
or perhaps an international tribunal (though the discussion below
regarding the legitimacy of international tribunals may call this
assertion into question). My contention here is limited. I do not
suggest that any of these institutions are the most effective organ-
izations for trying alleged terrorists. Rather, I merely argue that
recent history suggests that these are perceived as the most legi-
timate. As I will discuss below, because the PMO Commissions
design process was closed off from isomorphic pressures, its de-
92. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 261 (2002). The authors
explain that President Bush's military order establishing military commissions was im-
mediately greeted with "impassioned criticism in the press, the legal academy, and Con-
gress." Id. This was in stark contrast to the widespread praise sixty years earlier when
President Roosevelt established a military commission to try Nazi saboteurs. Id. The au-
thors attribute the different reactions to the public's view that the 2001 threat was not as
significant as the 1942 threat and a post 1960's shift in the public's attitudes toward gov-
ernment which caused a decrease in trust of executive and military authority. Id. at 262.
On effectiveness grounds, the authors contend that the public viewed "past civil liberty
intrusions [as] unnecessary or excessive." Id.
93. See supra Part II.
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velopment and evolution toward a more legitimate form was
stunted.
As noted, a key premise of institutional theory is that organiza-
tions seeking legitimacy will evolve to resemble other organiza-
tions in their field. There are three presumptions inherent in the
theory: first, that the organization (or its organizational design
team) is in fact concerned with legitimacy and the benefits to be
derived from it; second, and related to the first, that the organiza-
tion will allow the mechanisms of isomorphism to effect organiza-
tional structure and processes; and finally, that the organization
views the mechanisms of isomorphism as reflective of the domi-
nant practices in its institutional field.
The process followed by the designers of the PMO Commissions
suggests that they were not outwardly concerned with the bene-
fits of legitimacy and external support and may even have exhi-
bited hostility to mechanisms of conformity which would lead to
greater legitimacy. Many of the problems associated with the
PMO Commissions can be traced to the process by which they
were created. I am not the first scholar to argue that a more
transparent and open process than the one used to create the
PMO Commissions could have led to a better outcome,94 and the
Supreme Court's 2006 Hamdan opinion makes the argument
even less profound from a constitutional standpoint.95 However,
my aim in this section is not to break new ground in suggestions
about policy development. Rather, it is to demonstrate how the
lessons of institutional theories of organizational design can in-
form future legal scholars and policymakers regarding the com-
ponents of legitimacy and its frequent conflicts with effectiveness.
Consider first the administration's long-standing refusal to
"acknowledge any affirmatively binding legal restrictions on
Guantanamo" despite the arguments of State Department offi-
cials that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should be
treated as customary international law.96 The Common Article 3
94. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 1, at 54-58; Kenneth Anderson, It's Congress's War
Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (arguing for Congress to take a more
proactive role in creating U.S. counterterrorism policy).
95. See infra Part III.B.1.
96. GOLDSMITH, supra note 90, at 119 ("Will Taft in the State Department had argued
in the 2002 Geneva debate that the United States should acknowledge that 'Common Ar-
ticle 3' of Geneva-which contains minimal wartime protections originally designed for
civil wars-governed GTMO as a matter of customary international law.").
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argument advanced by State Department officials-who were
steeped in a deep understanding of international law and diplo-
macy-represented both a normative form of isomorphic pressure
(due to the professionalization of international lawyers within the
State Department) and informal coercive isomorphic pressure be-
cause it suggested that compliance with Common Article 3 was
not formally binding, but should be followed nonetheless because
it would demonstrate the United States was conforming with the
practice of other nations. The advice, if followed, may have
blunted the dominant critique of the international community
that the United Sates had contempt for international law.97 Fol-
lowing the advice of those State Department officials may have
garnered greater legitimacy for the PMO Commissions and per-
haps avoided their invalidation by the Supreme Court in Ham-
dan.9"
A culture of resistance to normative pressures also played a
role in the (il)legitimacy of the PMO Commissions. Jack
Goldsmith describes how David Addington, legal counsel to Vice
President Cheney, repeatedly dismissed any advice which sought
to garner the support of Congress or might placate allies.99 Ad-
dington believed that the President's power would diminish if
Congress declined to support him.' 0 Thus, if a policy could be jus-
tified "on the President's sole authority," and going to Congress
might limit that authority, outside support or legitimation was
not sought by the administration. 1 ' As a result of this resistance
to normative pressures, a unilateral approach was followed which
only yielded to mechanisms of conformity when faced with formal
coercive pressures, such as Supreme Court review. 02 The conse-
97. Id. at 120. For example, Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European
Reform, stated that "[tihe European concern [is] that America doesn't believe in interna-
tional law, doesn't believe in submitting itself to rules, organizations or norms that limit
its freedom of action." Id. (emphasis added).
98. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
99. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 90, at 124-25; see also id. at 76-77 (describing Ad-
dington's relationship with Vice President Cheney).
100. Id. at 124.
101. Id. (describing the governing legal questions advanced by Addington "whenever
someone proposed that the White House work with Congress to clear away a legal restric-
tion or to get the legislature on board: 'Do we have the legal power to do it ourselves?'
(meaning on the President's sole authority), and 'Might Congress limit our options in ways
that jeopardize American lives?").
102. See id. at 125 ("Whenever the Supreme Court threatened to review one of the ad-
ministration's terrorism policies, Paul Clement was able to eke out small concessions from
the White House.").
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quential long-term undermining of organizational legitimacy was
left for later, to be dealt with in Addington's words, "when and if
it is necessary to do so."
10 3
Another view of this insular development process was persua-
sively articulated by David Glazier, who details how the PMO
Commissions were created in a manner walled off from considera-
tions about external legitimacy-even those considerations which
may have been articulated by Cabinet officials within the admin-
istration. Glazier notes that, "[w]hile an interagency working
group was exploring legal options in the fall of 2001, Vice Presi-
dent Cheney circumvented normal governmental processes by
having [David Addington] draw up a military order that he then
persuaded the President to sign."'14 This drafting excluded from
the process the Attorney General and presumably the State De-
partment and members of the military who could offer input re-
garding the legitimate practices of contemporary tribunals.0 ° The
consequences of this insular process, shielded from the insight of
professionals who could have exerted normative isomorphic pres-
sure, resulted in the mimicry of a 1942 order that, Glazier notes,
Roosevelt himself had partially repudiated two years later. And giv-
en the major advances in U.S. military and civilian criminal justice
in the last half-century as well as the substantial protections subse-
quently codified in both the law of war and International Human
Rights Law, it was irrational for any lawyer to conclude that 1940s
trial standards would be acceptable today.'
0 6
While these accounts suggest that one person, or a handful of
people, were singularly responsible for rejecting concerns ground-
ed in the value of external support and legitimacy, top officials
throughout the administration largely shared a view of interna-
tional relations which demonstrated little concern for the benefits
of legitimacy and external support. In fact, many administration
officials, according to one account, believed that in dealing with
threats and challenges, "'the United States and Europe have
parted ways.' The militarily powerful United States ... is strateg-
ically devoted to maintaining peace and security through unilate-
103. Id. at 125-26 (explaining how Addington "focused on preventing an attack that
day or that week, and not on what might happen next year or beyond").
104. David Glazier, A Self Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the
Guantdnamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 147 (2008).
105. See id.
106. Id. at 148.
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ralism and coercion .... [Wleak Europeans, by contrast, were
strategically devoted to securing these ends using international
laws and institutions, and through persuasion and negotiation." °7
Operating under this mindset, the White House believed that the
international community was "dead set against the military ap-
proach to counterterrorism that the United States thought neces-
sary," leaving little room-or need-for compromises.' 8 The legi-
timacy costs with regard to the administration's Guantdinamo
policy were dismissed as inconsequential, and arguments in favor
of conformity were disregarded as "fashionable" or meeting "the
aesthetic of the moment."0 9
Thus, returning to our theories of institutional isomorphism,
we can see that, mimetically, the PMO Commissions were a re-
sponse to uncertainty because they were directed at the indeter-
minacy regarding how to deal with the A1-Qaeda threat and mi-
micked an existing form by copying much of their procedures
from the World War II commissions and the precedent of Qui-
rin." They therefore satisfy two of the theoretical prerequisites
for mimetic isomorphism; however, mere duplication under pres-
sure in the face of uncertainty is not enough. Institutional theory
posits that the isomorphic pressure must also lead to conformity
within an institutional field. It is on this point-field selection-
107. GOLDSMITH, supra note 90, at 127 (quoting Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness,
113 POLICY REV., June-July 2002, at 3). Kagan's essay was "widely circulated inside the
administration" and "gave structure to intuitions that top administration officials already
possessed." Id.
108. Id. For example:
Addington and company [] [believed] that there were few if any real strategic
costs to not compromising. They thought the heated public reaction to GTMO
and military commissions was rhetorical froth that had few real conse-
quences for the war on terrorism. The same allies that complained bitterly in
public were vigorously cooperating behind the scenes on issues like intelli-
gence sharing and interdiction of terrorist financing, where they had much to
gain.
Id. at 127-28. Faced with such gains in effectiveness behind the scenes, it is perhaps un-
surprising that administration officials were unconcerned with the potential legitimacy
costs of nonconformity.
109. Id. at 128-29 (quoting Jeffrey Goldberg, A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith
Knew, and When He Knew It, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2005, at 36) (describing an interview
with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who stated: "When history
looks back, , . . I want to be in the class of people who did the right thing, the sensible
thing, and not necessarily the fashionable thing, the thing that met the aesthetic of the
moment.'" According to Goldsmith, "[tihis was precisely David Addington's attitude to
hard legal decisions about terrorism.") Id. at 129.
110. Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions: Trying American Justice, ARMY LAW., Nov.
2003, at 12.
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in which the PMO Commissions can best be described as a form
of imperfect mimetic isomorphism-they duplicated a trial system
which had largely fallen out of favor in the nearly sixty years
since their prior use.'11 In short, the organizational designers
mimicked an organizational form which was no longer legitimate
in its field.
As suggested earlier, the questionable legitimacy of the Quirin
commission and its unreliability as a precedent-especially in
light of history-should have been apparent to the designers of
the PMO Commissions. In fact, in 1944, just a few years after the
Quirin case, the United States again captured saboteurs within
its borders, but instead of following the tribunal practices used in
Quirin, they created a new structure with improved due process
rights aimed at bolstering the tribunal's legitimacy.'12 This seem-
ing repudiation of the Quirin precedent should have been enough
to cue the designers of the PMO Commissions into their potential
legitimacy challenge.
However, even more evidence existed. Louis Fisher points out
that shortly after the Court released its Quirin opinion, Justice
Frankfurter requested that an expert on military law evaluate
the decision.1 3 That expert concluded that the administration
"disregard[ed] ... 'almost every precedent in the books' when it
111. Cf. Otto Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REV.
333 (1965) (showing support for Nuremberg shortly after the trials); Timothy L.H.
McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681 (1997) (describing the United States' resistance
to the "creation of collective international structures"); Theodor Meron, Reflections on the
Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, (2006)
(highlighting the similarities and differences between the post-World War II tribunals and
the modern tribunals to show how humanitarian law has evolved). But see Paul Hoffman,
Justice Jackson, Nuremberg, and Human Rights Litigation, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1145 (2005)
(advocating Justice Jackson's view of international criminal law). See generally Henry T.
King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremburg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S.
Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47 (1999) (tracing international criminal law
from Nuremburg to the Rome statute); Paul D. Marquandt, Law Without Borders: The
Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73
(1995) (describing constitutional objections to the development of International Criminal
Courts).
112. See Davis, supra note 36, at 125-26.
113. FISHER, supra note 63, at 180 (explaining how "Frederick Bernays Wiener,
[Frankfurter's] former student but by then an acknowledged expert on military law" eva-
luated the decision and "emphasized that court-martial procedures had 'almost uniformly
been applied to military commissions,' and that it was 'too plain for argument' that the
President could not waive or override the required" review).
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established the military tribunal. 114 Similarly, in 1962 Justice
Douglas criticized the procedures followed by the court stating
that "[t]he experience with Ex Parte Quirin indicated, I think, to
all of us that it is extremely undesirable to announce a decision
on the merits without an opinion accompanying it. Because once
the.., examination of the grounds that had been advanced is
made, sometimes those grounds crumble.""'5 Another more recent
critique referred to the Quirin opinion as an example of the
Court's status as "'an unreliable guardian of the Bill of Rights"'
while another called the opinion '"an agonizing effort to justify a
fait accompli.' which "represented a 'constitutional and propa-
ganda victory' for the executive branch but 'an institutional de-
feat' for the Supreme Court.""11 If legitimacy were the goal of the
PMO Commissions-which is still an open question-the lessons
of the Quirin precedent should have suggested that goal would
not be achieved.
Other legitimacy lessons were present for the designers of the
PMO Commissions-lessons that they did not heed. In the world
of war crimes tribunals, the Quirin commissions do not stand
alone as being subject to criticism on grounds of illegitimacy. In
fact, the judicial innovation, which characterizes international
criminal courts was throughout history subject to criticism on il-
legitimacy grounds." 7 King Charles I, during his seventeenth
century trial, "demanded to know 'by what authority-legal, I
114. Id.
115. Conversation between Walter F. Murphy, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence
Emeritus, Princeton University, with Justice William 0. Douglas (June 9, 1962) (on file at
the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University), available at http://www.
princeton.edu/-mudd/finding-aids/douglas/douglaslO.html.
116. FISHER, supra note 63, at 180-81 (citing Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court
Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59,
95 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 61 (1996)). Da-
nelski 'cautioned the Court to 'be wary of departing from its established rules and practic-
es, even in times of national crisis, for at such times the Court is especially susceptible to
co-optation by the executive.'" Id. at 181 (citing Danelski, supra, at 80).
117. But see Richard P. Dimeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining
Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 155, n. 161 (2005). Dimeglio states:
Whether recent war crimes tribunals have been effective in generating public
confidence in the legitimate process of justice is debatable. Unfortunately,
negative views by the ruling government in a nation that is undergoing tri-
bunals can undermine public confidence in the process. This has occurred in
both Rwanda and Serbia as those national governments have taken actions to
criticize and undermine the legitimacy of the international tribunal process.
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mean-do you sit as a court to judge me?""'11 Following World
War II, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone described the Nurem-
burg tribunal as "a high-grade lynching party," while Supreme
Court Justice William 0. Douglas believed the process was pre-
mised upon "an ex post facto law," which, despite Nazi "guilt[,]
did not justify us in substituting power for principle."19 Indeed,
"[w]hen given a copy of his indictment before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Herman Goring stroked the
phrase '[t]he victor will always be the judge and the vanquished
the accused' across its cover." 2° The view of the World War II
Tokyo tribunal was no less charitable. One jurist, "Justice
R6ling[,] conceded that the Japanese were being tried for 'political
crimes,' while another, Justice Pal, felt the distinctions made in
selecting triable crimes were "of purely 'propagandist relev-
ance."'12' Similarly, the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita was
characterized as being "flawed from start to finish, with twelve
international correspondents voting 12 to 0 that he should have
been acquitted. ' 22 While arguments about the legitimacy of the
military commissions were playing out, Slobodan Milsovic was
arguing in The Hague that his trial was a sham, stating:
I wish to say that the entire world knows that this is a political
process. So we are not here speaking about legal procedures that
evolve into political ones. This is a political process to begin with,
and as far as what I would prefer, I would prefer the truth.
12 3
More recently, in Iraq Saddam Hussein argued against his war
crimes tribunal by claiming it was illegitimate, ultimately boycot-
ting the proceedings, and forcing the chief judge in his case to
hear his lawyers' arguments to that effect.
24
As the preceding discussion makes clear, in theory, one may be
able to design an institutionally isomorphic-and thereby legiti-
mate-tribunal, custom-tailored to the contingencies of particular
crimes and criminals and designed to maximize its effectiveness.
However, the history of prior attempts at judicial innovation
118. SCHARF & McNEAL, supra note 50, at 15.
119. Jeremy Rabkin, Nuremberg Misremembered, 19.2 SAIS REV. 82-83 (1999).
120. SCHARF & MCNEAL, supra note 50, at 15.
121. GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE
REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2007).
122. FISHER, supra note 63, at 182.
123. SIMPSON, supra note 121, at 14-15.
124. See SCHARF & MCNEAL, supra note 50, at 78-79.
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without concern for legitimacy stands as a solemn warning.'25 In
fact, not only does the history of war crimes tribunals make evi-
dent their vulnerability to critiques on legitimacy grounds (most-
ly from potential defendants), their departure from what may be
perceived as the accepted organizational form for criminal trials
further contributes to their lack of legitimacy in their organiza-
tional field (other courts). This suggests the possibility that re-
viewing courts will invalidate attempts at contingent-based de-
signs.
It is important to recall that organizational theory argues that
an organization's adoption of the normatively appropriate struc-
ture can lead to legitimacy and support from external organiza-
tions. 126 In the context of a solution for the military commissions,
this suggests that such an institution must be structured like ex-
isting U.S. courts (e.g., Article III courts or courts-martial). Struc-
turing such tribunals in any other fashion, even one mimicking
other existing war crimes tribunals, may fail to achieve an optim-
al level of legitimacy. This is a key lesson for military commission
reformers and advocates of national security courts.
B. The Lessons of the MCA: Illegitimacy Identified and the Seeds
of Incomplete Isomorphism
1. The Hamdan Mandate as Formal Coercive Isomorphism
In its 2006 Hamdan decision, the Supreme Court ultimately
found that the PMO Commissions were illegitimate.'27 The Court
held that Hamdan's military commission lacked power to proceed
"because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and
the Geneva Conventions." 2 ' The Hamdan opinion can be unders-
tood as formal coercive isomorphism. It was a command from the
Court to the executive branch mandating a structure and set of
procedures for the military commissions that could satisfy the re-
quirements of legality and legitimacy. Structurally, the PMO
125. But see Asa W. Markel, The Future of State Secrets in War Crimes Prosecutions, 16
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 411, 413 n.6 (2007) (noting that "[bloth war crimes tribunals of the
1940's paid lip service to legitimacy, to varying degrees, derived from the United Na-
tions").
126. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 150-51.
127. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
128. Id. at 567.
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Commissions featured several defects that violated the UCMJ
and the Geneva Convention's requirement of a "regularly consti-
tuted court."129 Among those defects were a lack of jurisdiction to
try offenses not committed within the field of command of the
convening authority, no showing of military necessity, and a fail-
ure to demonstrate the existence of war crimes both substantively
and temporally.13
Procedurally, the Court found "significant procedural impro-
prieties" interrelated with the previously identified problem of
"whether a 'regularly constituted court' [had] been created."13' In
this respect, the Court's mandate was explicitly isomorphic, not-
ing the requirement that "[tihe UCMJ conditions the President's
use of military commissions on compliance not only with the
American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ
itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of
the law of nations."'132 Additional concerns that the Court articu-
lated included: the exclusion of the accused and his counsel from
proceedings; lax rules of evidence, which allowed for the admis-
sion of nearly any evidence; and an insular appellate process. 133
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the Court articu-
lated "the general need for 'uniformity' of courts-martial and mili-
tary commission procedures."134 Both formally and informally, the
Court was coercively declaring that the PMO Commissions must
conform with the legitimate institutions in their field. The Court
stated:
[Tihe procedures governing trials by military commission historically
have been the same as those governing courts-martial.... As recent-
ly as the Korean and Vietnam wars ... the principle of procedural
parity was espoused as a background assumption.
The uniformity principle is not an inflexible one; it does not prec-
lude all departures from the procedures dictated for use by courts-
martial. But any departure must be tailored to the exigency that ne-
129. JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL
RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR 121 (2007).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 121-22.
132. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
133. See id. at 123.
134. PAUST, supra note 129, at 123.
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cessitates it.... Article 36 [of the UCMJ] places two restrictions on
the President's power to promulgate rules of procedure for courts-
martial and military commissions alike. First, no procedural rule he
adopts may be "contrary to or inconsistent with" the UCMJ-
however practical it may seem. Second, the rules adopted must be
"uniform insofar as practicable." That is, the rules applied to mili-
tary commissions must be the same as those applied to courts-
martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable. 13
The Hamdan Court's recognition of a tension between unifor-
mity and practicality can be understood in organizational terms
as a tension between legitimacy through conformity and effec-
tiveness -the same tension observed in the conflict between in-
stitutional and contingency theories of organizational design. The
Court further noted the illegitimacy of a departure from accepted
practices, especially when such a departure was not even
grounded in a structural contingency-based rationale of effective-
ness:
The absence of any showing of impracticability is particularly dis-
turbing when considered in light of the clear and admitted failure to
apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded not just by
the Manual for Courts-Martial but also by the UCMJ itself: the right
to be present. Whether or not that departure technically is "contrary
to or inconsistent with" the terms of the UCMJ, the jettisoning of so
basic a right cannot lightly be excused as "practicable."
136
Importantly, the Court did not limit its evaluation to mere con-
formity with the UCMJ, a formal coercive measure; it also man-
dated that the tribunal comport with Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, a heretofore informal coercive dictate. 137
The Court required that the tribunal be a "regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples." 13 Thus, the Court man-
dated two additional legitimacy requirements: first, the notion of
regular constitution; and second, indispensible judicial guaran-
tees. "'39 The former speaks to legitimacy in formation while the
latter speaks to legitimacy in function. Both are the concern of in
135. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 617-20 (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at 624 (internal citations omitted).
137. See id. at 631-32.
138. PAUST, supra note 129, at 125 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War art. 3(1)(d), opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135).
139. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-33.
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stitutional theory as they are tied to the acceptance of the tribun-
al by its external environment.
With regard to the term "regularly constituted court," the opi-
nion noted that the term "is not specifically defined in either
Common Article 3 or its accompanying commentary" but other
sources (which can be termed informal coercive mechanisms) help
to explain its core meaning.14 ° In dicta, the Court stated:
The commentary accompanying a provision of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, for example, defines "regularly constituted" tribunals to
include "ordinary military courts" and "definitely excludes all special
tribunals."... [One of the Red Cross' own treatises defines "regular-
ly constituted court" as used in Common Article 3 to mean "estab-
lished and organised in accordance with the laws and procedures al-
ready in force in a country."... (observing that "ordinary military
courts" will "be set up in accordance with the recognized principles
governing the administration of justice").14 1
The passage above illustrates the mechanisms of isomorphism
at work. First, the Court formally and coercively mandated a re-
quirement for regular constitution, citing to an informal coercive
mechanism. Then, in dicta, the Court informally yet coercively
cited to sources that help explain what structure and practices
will lead to legitimacy by referencing the commentary to the Ge-
neva Conventions and the treatises of the Red Cross. The Red
Cross, through its interpretations of the Geneva Conventions, ex-
erts a form of informal coercive isomorphism, and in so far as pro-
fessionals from the Red Cross represent the core beliefs of profes-
sionals educated and professionalized within the field, they also
exhibit the conformity pressures of normative isomorphism which
is internalized by professionals, particularly lawyers within the
U.S. military.'42 Regardless of which particular mechanism of
140. Id. at 632.
141. Id. (internal citations omitted).
142. The ICRC in fact plays a formal role in the development and interpretation of in-
ternational humanitarian law which influences the U.S. and other nation's interpretations
of the Geneva Conventions. See Roger P. Alford, The Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace Prize Lau-
reates as International Norm Entrepreneurs, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 61, 93-95 (2008) (explaining
that the ICRC's duties include developing, monitoring, promoting, enforcing, protecting,
and interpreting international humanitarian law). This description of the role of the ICRC
suggests that the organization's pronouncements are at a minimum examples of informal
coercive pressure, and in fact border on formal coercive pressure. For a more thorough
overview of the work of the ICRC, see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE HUMANITARIANS: THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (2005); Knut Dormann & Louis Maresca,
The International Committee of the Red Cross and Its Contribution to the Development of
International Humanitarian Law in Specialized Instruments, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 217 (2004).
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conformity one attributes to these developments, each of the
sources the court cited identify as legitimate those courts that are
established, organized, and recognized, declaring that "all special
tribunals" tailored to the circumstances, no matter how efficient
or effective are "definitely exclud[ed]. "
In procedure as well, the Court mandated compliance with the
accepted form within the military commission's institutional field,
rejecting creative efforts to depart from popularly legitimated
practices. The Court held that "the procedures governing the tri-
bunal" must afford "'all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'" Those guarantees
"must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those
trial protections that have been recognized by customary interna-
tional law. '145 Four of the five judges constituting the majority
looked to Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (adopted
in 1977 but not ratified by the United States) as persuasive evi-
dence of Protocol I's status as customary international law.1 46 In
this respect, the Court mandated (using both a formal and infor-
mal coercive mechanism) that legitimacy comes from conformi-
ty-and not merely conformity with binding rules, but conformity
with recognized practices and customs.1
47
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, largely framed in terms of sta-
tutory interpretation, provided additional informally coercive
reinforcement of the principle that departures from recognized
See also Till Miller, Customary Transnational Law: Attacking the Last Resort of State So-
vereignty, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 19, 25-26 (2008) ("The ICRC is an active partic-
ipant in all aspects of international law. It routinely is involved in negotiating and draft-
ing international treaties. Moreover, the ICRC is the only organization monitoring
compliance with humanitarian law and the prohibition of torture on a regular basis, thus
decisively shaping the content of these norms. Finally, the ICRC is publishing an exten-
sive work on 'Customary International Humanitarian Law,' which, given the prominent
role of the ICRC in the field of humanitarian law, should be regarded as authoritative and
will surely be used by every state official active in this field.").
143. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632.
144. Id. at 633 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, supra note 138, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See generally, MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); MICHAEL BYERS,
Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law From an Interdis-
ciplinary Perspective 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995) (explaining the interaction between
formal rules, informal customs, and politics in the development and force of customary
international law).
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practices would undermine the legitimacy of the proceedings un-
less some practical justification was expressed.14 For example, he
noted the departure from the rules of evidence governing regular
courts-martial149 noting that the Military Rules of Evidence are
largely based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, but unlike ei-
ther set of rules, Commission Order Number 1 allowed the ad-
mission of evidence if it "would have probative value to a reason-
able person."15 ° Under this standard, any statement, regardless of
reliability, could possibly be admitted into evidence. This was a
departure from the accepted and thereby legitimate rules for tri-
als because the Military Rules of Evidence prohibited evidence
"obtained through coercion, hearsay, the product of multiple le-
vels of hearsay, or unsworn depositions."15" ' Elsewhere, the Court
stated:
[A] striking feature of the rules governing Hamdan's commission is
that they permit the admission of any evidence that, in the opinion
of the presiding officer, "would have probative value to a reasonable
person." Under this test, not only is testimonial hearsay and evi-
dence obtained through coercion fully admissible, but neither live
testimony nor witnesses' written statements need be sworn.
152
The plurality of the Court, joined by Justice Kennedy, rejected
the government's contingency-based approach. Under that ap-
proach, the government argued that "the danger posed by inter-
national terrorism" made adoption of military commission rules
that conformed with courts-martial impracticable. 53 Rejecting
this argument, the Court instead required conformity with the le-
gitimated practices of courts-martial regarding coerced testimo-
ny. 54
Perhaps even more instructive for institutional reformers of
military commissions and national security court proponents is
the fact that Justice Kennedy went beyond mere statutory inter-
pretation and provided guidance to Congress on how to resolve
the deficiencies in the PMO Commissions. He stated that Con-
148. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 640.
150. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 § 6(d)(1) (2002).
151. Douglas A. Hass, Note, Crafting Military Commissions Post-Hamdan: The Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, 82 IND. L.J. 1101, 1118 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
152. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 614 (internal citations omitted).
153. Id. at 623.
154. Id. at 624.
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gress had the power to "change [the commissions], requiring a
new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other govern-
ing laws."155 Moreover, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Breyer's
short concurrence, which noted that since "no emergency pre-
vents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that
consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with
danger."156 The suggestion of this concurrence was that if the
President conformed the military commissions to congressional
requirements, those commissions would be legitimate and the
Court would have no grounds for overturning them. 57 Implicit in
this point though, is the belief that Congress would act in a man-
ner consistent with the accepted practices in the relevant organi-
zational field; that is to say that Congress would craft a system
that was legitimate both as a matter of domestic law and of in-
ternational law-at least as viewed by the Court.55
2. The MCA: Selective Isomorphism
In response to the Hamdan decision, Congress passed the
MCA, 59 bringing military commissions into partial conformity
with what the Court suggested were the legitimate practices of
Article III courts and courts-martial. 6 ° The process by which the
MCA was developed, however, suggests that many of the mis-
takes of the PMO Commission's design process were repeated,
mistakes which national security court proponents should remain
cognizant of. Moreover, analyzing the MCA design process also
provides insight into how effectively the President and Congress
155. Id. at 653 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
157. See id.
158. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (invalidating provisions
of the MCA). See generally Richard Klingler, The Court, the Culture Wars, and Real Wars,
A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP., June 2008, at 1, 4 ("When the Court first overturned the Execu-
tive's claim that statutory habeas did not extend to Guantdnamo, Congress promptly re-
versed that decision. Overlooking that statutory bar, the Court then overturned the Presi-
dent's military commissions-because Congress had not endorsed them and with the
invitation for the President and Congress to address the issue together. They did so
through the MCA, overruling or modifying nearly every aspect of the Court's decision. In
Boumediene, the Court insisted on the final word... finding the MCA's tribunal process
inadequate and striking its treatment of habeas suits. Boumediene thus joins a long line of
cases where the Court insists that it finally determine, on uncertain legal grounds, a re-
peatedly contested political or policy issue.").
159. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
160. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622.
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responded to the Hamdan Court's concerns with conformity and
legitimacy. While the Hamdan decision made the illegitimacy of
the PMO Commissions clear and suggested that Congress should
conform any new system to the accepted practices of other tri-
bunals,16' the drafters' process for developing the MCA suggests
they resisted the call for conformity, selectively complied with
Hamdan and selectively mimicked legitimate structures and
practices. The result of this selective development process can be
termed incomplete or selective isomorphism, the results of which
were a failure to garner external support grounded in legitimacy.
As the prior discussion of institutional theory made clear, legi-
timacy is derived from conformity. While conformity may not al-
ways lead to the most effective organizational structure, effec-
tiveness is not the dependent variable for the theory of
institutional isomorphism. 16' The MCA is an instructive example
of selective isomorphism, where conformity pressures were effec-
tive in bringing about some reforms that forced aspects of the mil-
itary commissions to conform with legitimate practices, while
nonetheless ensuring that the organization would continue to be
perceived as illegitimate overall due to incomplete conformity. To
understand this outcome, it is helpful to analyze the legislative
history of the MCA.
On September 6, 2006, President Bush held a press conference
where he announced that the administration had transferred a
group of "High Value Detainees" ("HVDs") to Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba, and confirmed that these detainees had been interrogated
by the CIA. 163 The President also confirmed that these HVD's
were subjected to interrogation using "an alternative set of proce-
dures," which the Department of Justice had reviewed and de-
termined to be lawful.' Concurrently, the President announced
he was submitting draft legislation to Congress, later titled the
Military Commission Act of 2006.16' The draft legislation "author-
161. Id. at 633-35.
162. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 7, at 147.
163. President's Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOc. 1569,
1570-71 (Sept. 6, 2006). These HVDs include Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah,
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and eleven other alleged terrorists. Id. at 1573.
164. Id. at 1571.
165. See id. at 1575; see also White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: The Administra-
tion's Legislation To Create Military Commissions (Sept. 6, 2006), http:l/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-6.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
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ize[d] military commissions to try detainees, amend[ed] the War
Crimes Act, and specif[ied] [that military commissions complied]
with Common Article 3" of the Geneva Conventions.
166
In response to the President's proposal, numerous pieces of
draft legislation were introduced in Congress. Most proposals
were identical to the President's proposed legislation.161 Of par-
ticular note were the "Bringing Terrorists to Justice Act of 2006,"
introduced by Senator Bill Frist;'16 the "Terrorist Tracking, Iden-
tification, and Prosecution Act of 2006," also introduced by Sena-
tor Bill Frist;169 and the "Military Commissions Act of 2006," in-
troduced by Representative Duncan Hunter.'7" At the center of
the legislative debates were differences of opinion regarding how
information derived by torture or coercion would be handled, and
whether such information would be admissible in a military
commission despite its inadmissibility in U.S. courts and interna-
tional tribunals.' 7 ' As noted above, the use of such evidence was a
concern of the Hamdan Court, and this concern was felt by legis-
lators as coercive isomorphic pressure to conform their new sys-
tem with the legitimate practices of other tribunals by explicitly
rejecting the admission of testimony derived by torture or coer-
cion. Moreover, as public scrutiny began to mount in the short pe-
riod of legislative debate, members of Congress, as institutional
designers, began to feel pressure in the form of culturally driven
isomorphism.
Given the pressure for conformity and uncertainty regarding
how to respond, the proposed legislation was largely mimetic, se-
lectively copying near-verbatim provisions from the UCMJ. Con-
gressman Hunter, one of the sponsors of the bill that ultimately
became the MCA, identified twenty-six "basic and fundamental
rights," which the legislation applied to the military commissions,
such as:
166. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE THE WAR CRIMES ACT:
CURRENT ISSUES 5 n.15 (2009), available at http://www.fas.orgsgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf
[hereinafter GARCIA].
167. Id.
168. Bringing Terrorists to Justice Act of 2006, S. 3861, 109th Cong. (2006).
169. Terrorist Tracking Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006, S. 3886, 109th
Cong. (2006).
170. Military Commissions Act of 2006, H.R. 6054, 109th Cong. (2006).
171. See generally 152 CONG. REC. H7522-60 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (floor debate on
Military Commissions Act of 2006).
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The right to counsel, provided by government at trial and through-
out appellate proceedings. An impartial judge. A presumption of in-
nocence. A standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The right to
be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable. The
right to service of charges sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a
defense. 172
However, the selective nature of this isomorphism was readily
apparent to the legislation's opponents, who noted that the legis-
lation incompletely chose what legitimate provisions it would bor-
row from the UCMJ, and because of this fact, it was, on its face,
subject to Constitutional challenges. For example, Congressman
Skelton in his floor statement argued that the legislation would
likely face several challenges to its legitimacy. ' First, it failed to
provide the right to habeas corpus,'74 a point the Supreme Court
agreed with in its 2008 decision in Boumediene.75 Second, it
created ex post facto laws,'76 a subject of a recent challenge in
Hamdan v. Gates.'77 Third, it left open the question of whether
"the Supreme Court would uphold a system that purports to
make the President the final arbiter of the Geneva Conven-
tion[s]."'78 Fourth, it failed to comport with evidentiary provisions
172. 152 CONG. REC. H7534 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hunter). The
other twenty-six rights identified by Congressman Hunter were: The right to reasonable
continuances; Right to peremptory challenge against members of the commission and chal-
lenges for cause against members of the commission and the military judge; Witness must
testify under oath; judges, counsel and members of military commission must take oath;
Right to enter a plea of not guilty; The right to obtain witnesses and other evidence; The
right to exculpatory evidence as soon as practicable; The right to be present at court with
the exception of certain classified evidence involving national security, preservation of
safety or preventing disruption of proceedings; The right to a public trial except for na-
tional security issues or physical safety issues; The right to have any findings or sentences
announced as soon as determined; Right against compulsory self-incrimination; Right
against double jeopardy; The defense of lack of mental responsibility; Voting by members
of the military commission by secret written ballot; Prohibitions against unlawful com-
mand influence toward members of the commission, counsel or military judges; 2/3 vote of
members required for conviction; 3/4 vote required for sentences of life or over 10 years;
unanimous verdict required for death penalty; Verbatim authenticated record of trial;
Cruel or unusual punishments prohibited; Treatment and discipline during confinement
the same as afford to prisoners in U.S. domestic courts; Right to review of full factual
record by convening authority; and Right to at least two appeals including to a Federal
Article III appellate court. Id.
173. 152 CONG. REC. H7536 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Skelton).
174. Id.
175. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
176. 152 CONG. REC. H7536 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Skelton).
177. 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134 (D.D.C. 2008).
178. 152 CONG. REC. H7536 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Skelton); see
also George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 430-33 (2006) (discussing Common Article Three's role in the MCA);
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found in federal law and the UCMJ, including those dealing with
coerced testimony, the right to confront witnesses and hearsay
rules, 179 all challenged by detainees in the recent Gates case.180
Finally, the legislation could face potential legitimacy problems
due to violations of due process and equal protection rights.
18 1
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the selective mimicry
of legitimate institutions by the drafters of the MCA was per-
ceived as illegitimate from the outset. This criticism should have
signaled to the designers of the MCA that their proposed system
would likely fail to garner external support due to its non-
conformity-based illegitimacy. However, their focus, much like
the focus of those who seek to craft national security courts, was
on effectiveness, not legitimacy.8 2 Moreover, even those provi-
sions that were identical to legitimate institutional forms, such as
those copied verbatim from the UCMJ, were deemed illegitimate
because they failed to comport with the type of fair trial stan-
dards one would expect in an Article III court.
One particular example stands out as representative of the le-
gitimacy challenges, faced by those provisions directly mimicking
the UCMJ. During the truncated debate over the MCA, three bills
included language in proposed section 949b intended to deal with
unlawful influence, a form of supervisory conduct that could allow
superiors to order subordinates to offer evidence derived from tor-
ture.8 3 In all three provisions, that language was identical to ar-
ticle 37 of the UCMJ, which states:
No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-
martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, reprimand,
or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or counsel
David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the MCA: On Striking the Right Balance (Univ. of
Va. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 70, 2007), avail-
able at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva-publiclaw/art70 (providing an overview of
Congress's and the President's response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in the form of the MCA).
See generally Hass, supra note 151 (discussing the MCA's incorporation of the Geneva
Conventions and how they fail to meet the fairness requirement set out by the Court in
Hamdan).
179. 152 CONG. REC. H7536 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Skelton).
180. See Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
181. See 152 CONG. REC. H7536.
182. See generally 152 CONG. REC. H7533-60 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (floor debate on
the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
183. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, H.R. 6054, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006); Terror-
ist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006, S. 3886, 109th Cong. § 104
(2006); Bringing Terrorists to Justice Act of 2006, S. 3861, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006).
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thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the
court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in
the conduct of the proceeding. No person subject to this chapter may
attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the ac-
tion of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member
thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the ac-
tion of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect
to his judicial acts. The foregoing provisions of the subsection shall
not apply with respect to (1) general instructional or informational
courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely for the
purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive
and procedural aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and in-
structions given in open court by the military judge, president of a
special court-martial, or counsel.
For all three bills, the language in section 949b for military
commissions mirrored this UCMJ provision:
(1) No authority convening a military commission under this
chapter may censure, reprimand, or admonish the military commis-
sion, or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect
to the findings or sentence adjudged by the military commission, or
with respect to any other exercises of its or his functions in the con-
duct of the proceedings.
(2) No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
means, influence the action of a military commission under this
chapter, or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence
in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing
authority with respect to his judicial acts.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply with respect to--
(A) general instructional or informational courses in military justice
if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing
members of a command in the substantive and procedural aspects of
military commissions; or
(B) statements and instructions given in open proceedings by a mili-
tary judge or counsel. 185
On its face, this language seemed to provide adequate protec-
tion from unlawful influence and was perceived as legitimate giv-
en its adoption from the UCMJ. However, as the discussion below
will make clear, there are key differences between courts martial,
and military commissions, which could allow for potential abuses
if this provision were allowed to stand. As debate within Congress
continued, greater attention was paid to the issue of detainee
treatment; such attention demonstrated how the mechanisms of
184. 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2006).
185. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, H.R. 6054, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006).
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conformity were able to influence the institutional design
process. 186 For example, more extensive debate allowed the public
and interest groups to voice their opinions (informal coercive iso-
morphism), the military judge advocates and other attorneys
could express their views as to the professional and legal stan-
dards that should govern tribunals (normative pressures), and in
the face of more extensive debate, legislative staff were able to
dedicate greater attention to the requirements the Supreme
Court established (formal coercive isomorphism) and best practic-
es adopted by legitimate tribunals (mimetic isomorphism).
It was in this process that Senator Warner proposed new legis-
lation, which took a harder stance regarding cruel treatment of
detainees, a stance intended to engender greater legitimacy for
the proposed system of military commissions. His bill, submitted
on September 14, 2006,187 followed the standards put forward in
the McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act.18 8 The
McCain Amendment "prohibits persons in the custody or control
of the U.S. government, regardless of their nationality or physical
location, from being subjected to 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.""89 The public debate over this issue
prominently placed Senator McCain and other senators at odds
with the administration over the issue of torture.90
While the public debate focused on torture and the inadequacy
of the proposed legislation, behind closed doors the mechanism of
normative isomorphic pressure was at work. Colonel Morris Da-
vis, then Chief Prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions,
feared that he would be pressured by administration officials to
offer evidence derived from torture in future military commission
proceedings.1 9' While the provisions in section 949b mirrored the
UCMJ, Colonel Davis felt that such provisions were insufficient
186. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S10352-63 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (floor debate on mil-
itary commissions).
187. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, S.3901, 109th Cong. (2006).
188. See 151 CONG. REC. S11061-62 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2005) (proposal of amendment by
Senator McCain) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
189. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, INTERROGATION OF
DETAINEES: OVERVIEW OF THE McCAIN AMENDMENT 3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.
orglsgp/crs/intel/RL33655.pdf.
190. See, e.g., Janet Hook & Richard Simon, McCain Stand Comes at Price, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2006, at Al.
191. It should be noted that from 2006 to 2007 the author served as an academic legal
consultant to Colonel Davis until his resignation as Chief Prosecutor.
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to meet the Supreme Court's concerns, articulated in Hamdan,
regarding coerced testimony. He met with legislators to ensure
they would include provisions protecting military attorneys from
political pressure. In an e-mail to the staff of Senator Lindsey
Graham prior to publication of S.3901, Colonel Davis stated:
I recommend amending the language in your section 949b, "Unlaw-
fully influencing action of military commission," by modifying section
(a)(2) to read:
(2) No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a military commission under this chapter, or
any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any
case; the convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect
to their judicial acts; or the exercise of professional legal judgment
by trial counsel or defense counsel.
192
He made clear his rationale for adding this important provi-
sion, stating:
The second part of the proposed section 949b provides defense coun-
sel some protections from adverse performance reviews and assign-
ments based upon zealously defending an accused, but the section
does not offer a prosecutor any protection at all. If, for instance, I de-
termine the prosecution will not offer any statement obtained as a
result of water boarding I shouldn't be subject to reprisal if someone
above me believes waterboarding is an acceptable way to extract evi-
dence. 1
93
It's helpful here to recall the earlier theoretical explication of
the tension between legitimacy and effectiveness and how an or-
ganization might segment itself in a manner intended to maxim-
ize both. Segmentation is often observed where the apex of an or-
ganization (here the Office of the Chief Prosecutor) is structured
to meets the demands of external legitimacy; while the internal
operating core (here the line prosecutors) may be structured to fit
contingencies such as the specific need to have flexibility regard-
ing what evidence might be offered at trial. The goal in seg-
mented adaptation is to meet both contingency and institutional
requirements. As the earlier discussion made clear, achieving
this goal is nearly impossible, a point illustrated by the selective
mimicry provisions found in the UCMJ.
192. E-mail from Col. Morris Davis to staff of Sen. Lindsey Graham (March 3, 2008,
17:08 EST) (on file with the author) [hereinafter E-mail].
193. Id. As the contemporaneous legislative history and public debates make clear, the
issue of torture and evidence derived from it permeates the entire military commissions
process. See McNeal, supra note 36, at 36-38.
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The concerns articulated above provide an illustration of the
conflict between effectiveness and legitimacy. While the rules
proposed in the MCA mimicked those of the UCMJ-perhaps
lending them external legitimacy due to the perception that the
UCMJ was in general, sufficiently protective-in the specific case
of the military commissions, with its different structures and in-
ternal practices, there existed the possibility that segmentation
would allow for an external perception of legitimacy while inter-
nally the commission could act in a normatively illegitimate
manner. In organizational theory terms, such segmentation re-
fers to the adoption of a structure or rules which fit the institu-
tional requirements in one part of the organization (e.g., legitima-
cy through conformity with the external expectation of an
independent prosecutor), while adopting a form that meets the
contingencies in another part of the organization (e.g., the desire
on the part of some within the administration to use evidence de-
rived through coercion)." 4
A close analysis of the legislative history of the MCA also re-
veals further organizational legitimacy concerns which stemmed
from Congress' attempt to adopt provisions that appeared legiti-
mate but would fail to allow the organization to actually conform
with culturally driven isomorphic expectations of fair and legiti-
mate trials. This internally voiced concern was stated as follows:
I believe it is important for a variety of reasons to make it patently
clear that a "military" commission is a "military" proceeding and not
some second-rate subterfuge for a federal district court where DOJ
attorneys can prosecute terrorists without the obstacles they'd face
in federal court. The military commissions are a part of the war ef-
fort and its structure should reflect the same. 195
Recognizing these concerns, Congress went beyond the re-
quested protections requested by the Chief Prosecutor, adding
provisions for prosecutors which extended to "the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment by trial counsel or defense counsel"19 6-more
expansive language than the narrower "professional legal judg-
194. Donaldson, supra note 74, at 11-15 (explaining the potential tension between con-
tingency and institutional theories and how segmented adaptations can but likely will not
allow an organization to maximize both external support and internal effectiveness). For a
more detailed discussion of the independence of the military commission prosecutor, see
generally McNeal, supra note 36.
195. E-mail, supra note 192.
196. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 3901, 109th Cong. § 949b(a)(2)(c) (2006)
(draft legislation by Sen. John Warner).
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ment" urged by Colonel Davis. Subsequently, three additional
bills were introduced, all of which were titled "The Military
Commissions Act of 2006. "19 These three other bills "reflected an
agreement reached by the Bush Administration and certain law-
makers to resolve [their] differences"19 and arrive at a compro-
mise necessary to get the MCA passed before Congress recessed
to campaign for the midterm elections.'99 While this example
shows how normatively driven isomorphic pressure can have an
influence, it is largely an anomaly attributable to one individual
who, due to his position, was able to highlight his concerns re-
garding select aspects of the new military commission system.
The story of the Chief Prosecutor's influence stands as an exam-
ple of how the strength of any one mechanism of conformity may
largely depend upon the force with which that mechanism is felt.
The MCA process, largely unconcerned with isomorphic pres-
sures which could lead to conformity, failed to address the broad-
er societal concerns regarding legitimacy advanced by many other
interested parties and members of Congress. The process was iso-
lated from other isomorphic mechanisms due in large part to the
truncated time Congress allocated for debate. Congressman Levin
highlighted this point in voicing his opposition to the MCA, stat-
ing:
[T]he Republican Leadership has chosen to stampede far-
reaching legislation through the House without adequate debate
or any opportunity for Members to offer amendments... The 96-
page bill before the House was negotiated in secret last weekend
and only introduced less than 48 hours ago. After waiting 5
years, can't we take even 5 days to consider a bill of this magni-
tude?
20 0
The process, much like the process that created the PMO
Commissions, was largely walled off from the mechanisms of iso-
morphism, which institutional theory suggests will prompt con-
formity and thereby legitimacy. Such isomorphic pressure, if felt,
may have ensured that the concerns of the MCA's opponents
would have been addressed ex ante rather than creating a system
197. GARCIA, supra note 166, at 5 n.15.
198. Id. (citing Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Differences Settled in Deal over
Detainee Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2006, at A9.
199. Kate Zernike, Top Republicans Reach an Accord on Detainee Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2006, at Al.
200. 152 CONG. REC. H7553 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Levin).
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which was destined to be challenged after its creation.2 ' Speak-
ing to the concerns of external legitimacy, Congressman Cardin
stated: "We should heed the warning given by our former Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Secretary of State Co-
lin Powell, who states that 'the world is beginning to doubt the
moral basis of our fight against terrorism.' 2 2 Institutional refor-
mers and national security court proponents should remain cog-
nizant of these legitimacy challenges.
C. Lessons from the Military Commissions
Perhaps the most interesting lesson to be learned from the or-
ganizational analysis detailed above is that innovation aimed at
achieving effectiveness is largely viewed as illegitimate when it
fails to conform with already accepted institutional forms. Orga-
nizational theorists studying businesses have persuasively shown
that innovation most often fails because it violates established in-
stitutional practices or falls into a void where no shared under-
standing about its merits exists. 203 Both reasons for failure stem
from a perception of illegitimacy that attaches to innovation when
compared to accepted practices.2 4 Legal scholars should note how
the history of military tribunals suggests a similar fate for inno-
vative judicial institutions. All such innovations, including those
in Nuremburg, Tokyo, the Hague, and Baghdad, have faced crit-
ics who railed against the legitimacy of these models that were
tailored to the exigencies of their circumstances. So too was the
case with both the PMO Commissions and the MCA iteration,
which begs the question: why should we expect any greater per-
ception of legitimacy to attach to a national security court? If or-
201. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("[The MCS] creates an unfair trial
system for military detainees, and does almost nothing to curb the President's power to
authorize interrogation tactics that are widely recognized as torture. Mr. Speaker, this so-
called compromise bill, is actually nearly identical to what the administration has sought
all along. The bill continues to allow secret evidence in trials, prohibits detainees from
challenging the merits of their detention in courts, and effectively allows the President to
authorize the CIA to continue inhumane detention and interrogation.").
202. 152 CONG. REC. H7554 (daily ed, Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Cardin); see
also 152 CONG. REC. H7553 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer) (ar-
guing that the legislation "repeat[s] the mistakes of the past," and "does nothing for our
security and attempts to add legitimacy to the current improper actions of the Bush ad-
ministration").
203. Deborah Dougherty & Trudy Heller, The Illegitimacy of Successful Product Inno-
vation in Established Firms, 5 ORG. SCi. 200, 201 (1994).
204. Id.
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ganizational theorists are correct in positing that legitimacy
stems from conformity, how can specialized tribunals with differ-
ing substantive and procedural rules fraught with disparate im-
pacts upon individual rights ever be viewed as legitimate? If his-
tory is a guide, the well-intentioned efforts at creating a national
security court will face the same legitimacy challenges which
have plagued other structurally contingent tribunals.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The previous discussion demonstrated that for an organization
to be perceived as legitimate, it must conform its practices to mir-
ror those that exist in its organizational field. Three fundamental
principles form a general framework for assessing existing insti-
tutions: effectiveness, fairness, and efficiency."' Interestingly,
lacking from this framework is the value of legitimacy. Thus,
these principles, rather than being viewed as absolute terms, in-
stead serve as a general framework that must be considered
alongside legitimacy.
In this framework, effectiveness suggests a system that will
make a society free from terrorism, but this is a contingent value
because how far a nation is willing to go toward achieving this
goal will necessarily impact the effectiveness of a tribunal. °6 As
discussed earlier, effectiveness is not the primary concern of an
institution seeking to conform through mechanisms of isomor-
phism, but the theory does not go so far as to say that effective-
ness is irrelevant overall. In fact, we can presume that the exist-
ing institutions have, through an evolutionary process of
differential survival, adopted an optimal level of effectiveness
that is deemed legitimate. Similarly, effectiveness and equity are
linked to efficiency. While a nation may be "willing to compromise
human rights and disregard the rule of law... [to] produce a
higher level of effectiveness," such measures may come "at the
cost of equity or fairness."2 °7 As institutions balance these values
205. Edward R. Maguire, Gregory J. Howard, & Graeme Newman, Measuring the Per-
formance of National Criminal Justice Systems, 22 INT'L J. CoMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST.
31, 38 (1998).
206. See id. ("All nations want to be free of crime (effectiveness), but how far are they
willing to go to achieve this goal? Are they willing to devote a substantial proportion of
their workforce and/or their gross national product to criminal justice? If so, they may
achieve a high level of effectiveness ...
207. Id.
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within this general framework, we can assume that "all nations
can be located somewhere in a three dimensional space defined by
the effectiveness, fairness, and efficiency " "' of their criminal jus-
tice and related counterterrorism systems, and that three-
dimensional space and the institutions it creates will form a
benchmark of legitimacy to which new institutions must conform.
Herein lies the challenge for national security court propo-
nents: the legitimacy that comes from conformity with the prin-
ciples of an Article III court will necessarily be in conflict with
any national security court proposal premised upon efficiency and
effectiveness. In short, a national security court, which by its na-
ture will be different from an Article III court, cannot logically
achieve a similar balance of the three fundamental principles ar-
ticulated above and therefore will face the potential for illegiti-
macy. Granted, some theorists argue that each of the dimensions
above can be treated equally, perhaps to create theoretical models
or to strip cultural biases from a study." 9 In the abstract, such an
approach makes sense. For example, it may be useful to weigh
each dimension equally to create a study that seeks to compare
different jurisdictions along the same measures or to use in a
study that seeks to come up with an idealized system beginning
from scratch. However, for the purposes of this article, which has
as its focus a conformity model of legitimacy, the challenge na-
tional security court proponents must sensitize themselves to is
that their rationally derived prescriptions, seeking to maximize
effectiveness, may be insufficient on their own.210 Instead, I con-
tend that institutional designers of national security courts are
cabined in their efforts by the path dependency of existing and
dominant institutions that have already garnered legitimacy.
208. Id. at 38-39.
209. Id. at 39 ("[Clonsider two nations that have the same crime rate, where one de-
votes twice the resources to criminal justice compared to the other but is half as fair or
equitable. These two nations would have the same level of performance according to the
scheme that we will suggest. Both nations presumably made choices about how to deal
with their crime problems: one chose to invest more resources, and one chose to play more
loosely with human rights standards. From a bias-free perspective, however, the two have
achieved equal levels of criminal justice performance.").
210. See Barreto & Baden-Fuller, supra note 4, at 1563 (explaining that the main dif-
ference between an institutional approach and an economic approach concerns the under-
lying mechanism which triggers conformity behaviors). In economic conformity behavior
models, the source of such behavior is an economically rational purpose, effectiveness in
the example of military commissions, whereas in isomorphic frameworks it is the norma-
tively rational motive of legitimacy which can both prompt and justify conformity beha-
vior. See id.
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Furthermore, the lessons from the development of the military
commissions indicate that selective mimicry of components drawn
from legitimate institutions as a means to create new institutions
will likely fail.211
In light of the legitimacy constraints facing national security
court proponents, the most appropriate institutional design ap-
proach may be to begin with an accepted and legitimate institu-
tional form and make selected modifications to that form to
achieve limited, structurally contingent gains. Stated differently,
the best method for approaching the institutional design process
of national security courts is to assess the legitimate Article III
court framework and determine where those courts are insuffi-
cient to meet the objectives of a robust counterterrorism pro-
gram.212 An institutional designer should then make selective
modifications to meet the deficiencies of the Article III framework
and in so doing, should explicitly acknowledge how they are ba-
lancing the trade-offs between legitimacy and effectiveness and
how they are ordering these values.
Granted, some of the national security court proposals have
taken this approach but have done so partly in reverse. They
have taken a bottom-up approach by identifying deficiencies in
the current processes and then suggested the creation of entirely
new institutions, rather than a top-down approach, which would
make modifications from the existing legitimate form.213 In light
211. See supra notes 170-199 and accompanying text (discussing immediate challenges
to MCA and experiences of Colonel Davis during the drafting of the MCA).
212. Notably, as this article went to print, a more detailed proposal by Jack Goldsmith
began to take this approach and even acknowledges the legitimacy benefits to be derived
from selective modifications to the Article III court framework. See Jack Goldsmith, Long-
Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court 6 (Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209_det
ention-goldsmith/0209_detentiongoldsmith.pdf (noting that "one way or another, Article
III judges will be in the detention game, helping to regularize, legalize, and legitimize the
detention process, while reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for each detention
judgment. In other words, once we accept that there will be a system of long-term, non-
criminal, military detention of alleged terrorists and that federal judges will supervise
that process, the debate about a national security court becomes a debate about what form
this federal judicial supervision should take"); see also WITTES, supra note 1, at 34-35 (ex-
plaining how Article III courts are capable of handling cases involving individuals who
pose a risk of future dangerousness, such as the mentally ill who are sometimes detained
based on violent acts that their condition may lead them to commit). But see Guiora &
Perry, supra note 1, at 361-63 (argument of Prof. Guiora, arguing for a hybrid domestic
terror court which substantially modifies the Article III court process to account for the
need to protect intelligence information).
213. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45
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of the history of illegitimacy associated with the military commis-
sions, I suggest that an approach that departs in too many re-
spects from an Article III court will find itself saddled with chal-
lenges to its legitimacy. In fact, when one considers the criticism
directed at innovation within Article III courts intended to deal
with the detention and trial of sexual predators and other partic-
ularly dangerous criminals, it is evident that legitimacy chal-
lenges may plague even my suggested approach focused on new
procedural and substantive rules.214 This history within Article
III courts of resistance to innovation, coupled with the checkered
history of military commissions, suggests that the bar is set peri-
lously high for proponents of new institutions such as national se-
curity courts. The analytical framework and design process out-
lined above adds legitimacy considerations to the institutional
designer's set of considerations. While this additional analytical
component may further complicate any design effort, I contend
that the benefits to be derived from maximizing legitimacy are
too important to neglect.
V. CONCLUSION
Institutional designers should factor into their proposed re-
forms an explicit consideration of the value organizations can de-
rive from legitimacy based conformity. The analytical framework
outlined above provides a conformity based model for evaluating
the legitimacy of an institution. This framework is useful for sen-
sitizing institutional designers and legal scholars to notions of le-
gitimacy which are derived from the pressure for conformity
placed on institutions by external observers. That conformity
pressure can force organizations to comply with formal and in-
formal external mandates, overcome uncertainty by copying exist-
WILLAMErTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (explaining that most national security court pro-
posals "fall into four rough groups: (1) That preventative detention of terrorism suspects is
not unlawful; (2) that CIPA and other evidentiary rules render traditional criminal prose-
cutions of terrorism suspects unworkable; (3) that, in general, the Article III courts are
inappropriate forums for terrorism cases; and (4) that there are no analogous tribunals
and/or procedures already available under extant law").
214. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Detentions Without Due Process of Law Following
September 11th, 20 TOURo L. REV. 889, 889-93 (2005) (explaining that the history of
American law is replete with unlawful detentions sanctioned by and brought about
through Article III courts); Mark A. Sheik, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New
Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1995) (critiquing Federal Rule of Evidence 413,
which makes evidence of a defendant's prior instances of sexual violence admissible, as a
departure from three hundred years of Anglo-American jurisprudence).
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ing and legitimate forms, and conform with the prevailing norms
in a professionalized field.
This analytical framework, with its focus on legitimacy, sensi-
tizes scholars to the fact that while an institution may achieve le-
gitimacy, it may do so by adopting an inefficient form. The dis-
cussion thus highlights that an institutional innovation such as a
national security court may effectively achieve certain goals asso-
ciated with counterterrorism, but may nevertheless fail to achieve
an optimal level of legitimacy. On balance this may be an accept-
able legal and policy outcome; however, scholars should explicitly
recognize the legitimacy tradeoff which is at play in their propos-
als.
As this article explains, the tradeoffs reflected in the tension
between effectiveness and legitimacy are apparent through a
close analysis of the history of innovative judicial institutions.
Institutional designers who seek to maximize legitimacy should
carefully scrutinize the institutional design process and its sus-
ceptibility to influence by mechanisms of conformity. A failure to
do so may lead to either incomplete or selective conformity which
may result in an institutional design which fails to achieve op-
timal levels of legitimacy.
The complex interaction between conformity, legitimacy, effec-
tiveness, and efficiency detailed above suggests that for a nation-
al security court to be perceived as legitimate it must conform its
practices with existing judicial institutions. This observation sug-
gests that because a national security court will by its nature de-
part from the structure and practice of an Article III court, na-
tional security court proponents must sensitize themselves to the
challenge of balancing conformity-based legitimacy with effec-
tiveness and efficiency. The best approach for the institutional
design process may be to narrowly and selectively modify the ex-
isting legitimate institutional form present in Article III courts,
rather than taking a bottom up approach which creates new insti-
tutions from scratch. Because the simultaneous maximization of
effectiveness and legitimacy is unlikely, scholars and institutional
designers should highlight the tradeoffs in their design proposals
and account for what factors they've elevated over others, noting
whether their design poses the risk of criticism on the grounds of
suboptimal legitimacy or suboptimal effectiveness.
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